http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/fenner1.htmCandrakiirti's refutation of Buddhist idealism
By Peter G. Fenner
In the seventh-century Buddhist tract Madhymakaavataara(1) (Introduction to the Middle Way; hereafter cited as MA) Candrakiirti establishes the Maadhyamika system of thought by refuting the tenets of various Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophies. In the course of these refutations he criticizes the Vij~naanavaada or Idealist school of Buddhism.(2)
The central issue in the critique is the Vij~naanavaada thesis that dependent (paratantra)
phenomena (really) exist.(3) The Vij~naanavaada support that thesis with the doctrines of the (real) existence of consciousness, the nonexternality of sense objects, the heuristic device of potentials
(`sakti) as the cause of sense experience; and apperception. It is these doctrines that
Candrakiirti criticizes.
http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/ew26114.htmCandrakiirti's critique of Vijnaanavaada
Olson, Robert F.
Candrakiirti's Madhyamakaauataara[1] provides, in part, an extensive critique of various schools of thought, Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike, contemporaneous with the author (seventh century), the great exponent of the Praasa^ngika Maadhyamika school and author of the Prassannapadaa, the most well-known commentary on the Madhyamakakaarikaas of Naagaarjuna. Candrakiirti devotes a large section of his work to a critique of certain Vij~naanavaada doctrines, a critique which may have played a significant role in the establishing of the Maadhyamika as the "official" doctrinal position of Tibetan Buddhism.
"in a sense they are not [followers] of this Dharma, because they, like the non-Buddhists, do not correctly understand the meaning of the teaching."Candrakiirti's chastening words are largely brought on by what he regards as an erroneous conception of the nature and function of pragmatic (uyauahaara) truth in relation to ultimate truth: the Vij~naanavaada goes astray by giving absolute validity to conceptions which have their place, if any, only on the level of expedient pragmatic truth. The basic Maadhyamika doctrine of pragmatic truth is well known.[l2] Conventional truth is necessary, both to worldly life and to Buddhist teaching, but its status as truth is solely a function of the relative coherence and pragmatic utility of its various component notions; from the standpoint of ultimate truth all conventional truth, including Buddhist doctrine, becomes fictive: "What hearing and what teaching [can there be] of the syllableless Dharma? Nevertheless the syllableless (artak.sara) is heard and taught by means of superimposition (samaaropa)"[13]--a superimposition of conventional truth upon what ultimately cannot be expressed. Candrakiirti says of himself, "For the sake of the results I conform to the world and say [of things that] do not exist, they do . . . . Imitating (rjes su brjod pa) [the world] is the means of converting it."[14] Conforming to the usage of the world means not entering into dispute with it, as the Buddha had said, "The world disputes with me, I do not dispute with the world. What in the world is claimed exists, I also say it exists; what in the world is claimed does not exist, I also say does not exist."[15] Of course, what is meant by the term "the world" is ambiguous: the world is the range of conventional truth, and that includes truths of the Dharma as well as what is normally meant by "worldly truth." From a Maadhyamika standpoint, the fact that the Buddha does not dispute with the world means ultimately that he does not dispute with those articulations of the Dharma which provide the only means of attaining ultimate truth; for once disputation begins, all conventional truth breaks down, as the Madhyamakakaarikaas had long before demonstrated. The point of view of the ordinary world "need not be overly criticized because the transactions (uyauahaara) of the world are due to having false ends."[l6] It is because of the simultaneous indispensability and fragility of conventional truth that the Maadhyamika refuses to dispute with it for the sake of higher, "meta-conventional'' truths. All truth which is capable of verbal articulation is conventional truth, and the conventional truth available in the suutras is adequate and sufficient to provide a means to ultimate truth, the Dharma which is not articulated.
Conventional truth is the method;
And the ultimate is its outcome.
Not knowing how the two truths differ,
Your thoughts will go astray.Introduction to the Middle Way, VI, 80