Filosofi Middle Way Nagarjuna

[xenocross]

Ini saya tulis sebagai catatan biar ga lupa dan ga bingung.
Kemarin bahannya didapat dari Public Teaching, terus diresearch lagi... makin pusing. Kalau ada yg bisa menjelaskan lagi, saya sangat berterima kasih

[xenocross]

> Sesuatu yang berdiri sendiri (tanpa sebab) tak dapat dihasilkan
> Dan hasil yang diakibatkan sesuatu yang tidak ada adalah seperti bunga
> (yang tumbuh)di angkasa
> Karena terdapat kesalahan pada kedua hal ini
> Maka tidak mungkin ada hasil dari keduanya
>
> Fenomena tidak dihasilkan dari dirinya sendiri
> Maupun dari fenomena lain (yang berdiri sendiri), ataupun oleh keduanya,
> ataupun tanpa penyebab
> Oleh karena itu mereka tidak mempunyai keberadaan yang sejati.

Disini diberikan 4 pandangan yang berbeda dari ajaran Buddha tentang asal-usul fenomena. Ada 4 pandangan yang dimiliki oleh aliran lain (termasuk zaman sekarang)
1. Fenomena mempunyai keberadaan yang inheren (berdiri sendiri)
2. Fenomena dihasilkan oleh fenomena lain yg mempunyai keberadaan inheren.
3. Fenomena dihasilkan oleh gabungan 2 fenomena di atas
4. Fenomena dihasilkan tanpa sebab.

Kita bahas kenapa secara logika 4 pandangan ini salah

1. Self-Sufficient, inherent,self- causation phenomena

Mari kita panggil fenomena pertama ini namanya si A.
A berdiri sendiri. A menyebabkan dirinya sendiri. A adalah sebab sekaligus akibat.
A tiba-tiba muncul begitu saja tanpa sebab lain, kecuali dirinya sendiri.
A --->A     A (sebab) menghasilkan A (akibat)
Kalau ini terjadi, berarti A sebab dan A akibat muncul pada waktu yang sama.
Muncul pertanyaan, kalau A akibat sudah ada, kenapa harus dihasilkan lagi?
Kalau A sebab menghasilkan A akibat, padahal pada saat yg sama sudah ada A akibat, akan ada dua A akibat yang identik!
Karena A adalah sebab sekaligus akibat, A akan terus menerus menciptakan diri sendiri
 A sebab ------> A akibat = A sebab ----------> A akibat ---> A akibat .......
Pusing kan? Gak mungkin kan?

The first, self- causation, is exemplified by the Vedic tradition of asserting the reality of the immutable Universal Soul, atman. Briefly, this declares all effects to be inherent in their cause, which cause is in every case some form of the eternal atman.

FOOTNOTE: cf. David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1975), 6-15 A problem with self- causation is that the effect must be inherent in the cause. If so, then nothing new has occurred or come to be.

"The Madhyamaka says that, if in fact cause and effect are identical, then having bought cottonseed with the price one would pay for cloth, one ought to be able to clothe oneself with it. The idea that cause and effect are identical thus leads to absurdity. If cause and effect are identical, then there would be no difference between father and son, and also no difference between food and excrement."
Peter D Santina, CHAPTER EIGHTEEN The Philosophy of the Middle Way.

Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness:
Moreover, a cause is not justified in the three times. It may be asked how? First, if it is supposed that the cause is prior (to the effect), of what is it the cause? Yet, if it is supposed that (the cause is) subsequent (to the effect), then what need is there for the cause, as the effect is already complete? Yet (again) if it is supposed that the cause and effect are simultaneous, then among the cause and the effect which originate simultaneously, which is the cause of which and which is the effect of which? Thus, in all the three times, a cause is not justified.


2. Fenomena disebabkan oleh fenomena external lain yg berdiri sendiri

Mari kita panggil fenomena kedua ini namanya si B.
B muncul sebagai hasil dari A (yg sudah ada di atas)
Nah lho! Bukannya sudah jelas si A --> A?  Kenapa bisa A ----> B?
A adalah fenomena yg berdiri sendiri, ada tanpa melalui proses, berarti dia statis dan tidak berproses. Sifat A adalah permanen. Kalau dia mau menghasilkan yg lain, dia harus berubah. Tapi A tidak mampu berubah. Jadi tidak mungkin B dapat dihasilkan.
Dan lagi, A sudah dijelaskan tidak ada, jadi B tidak mungkin ada

Alasan lain adalah bahwa A dan B mempunyai sifat yg berbeda. Apa bisa tikus menghasilkan gajah?

Atau karena A, tanpa pengaruh fenomena lain, dapat menghasilkan B, maka dikatakan B secara intrinsik ada dalam A/ sifat B ada dalam A.
Hal ini sama saja mengatakan bahwa biji pohon sebesar pohon, atau biji pohon seberat pohon yg sudah besar.
Biji pohon menjadi pohon tergantung oleh sebab2 lain.

Other- or external- causation declares all change to be produced by some form of a deus ex machina, such as God, fate, or a deterministic self- nature.

FOOTNOTE: ibid., 5 A problem with other-causation is that if cause and effect are different then the relation is lost, and, for example, fire could be produced from water.

"In the case of the second alternative--that cause and effect are different--anything could originate from anything else, because all phenomena are equally different. Hence a stalk of rice might just as easily originate from a piece of coal as from a grain of rice, for there would be no connection between a stalk of rice and a grain of rice, and a piece of coal and a grain of rice would have the same relationship of difference to a stalk of rice. Thus the notion that cause and effect are absolutely different is an intrinsically absurd idea."
Peter D Santina


3. Fenomena dihasilkan oleh gabungan 2 fenomena di atas

Kita panggil dia si C.      A + B -----> C

Kan A dan B tidak ada? Berarti C tidak ada !

A third type of causal theory advocated by some schools is basically a combination of the self- and other-causation. The problem with this is that both of the above two problems are compounded.

"The third alternative--that cause and effect are both identical and different--is no more acceptable, and suffers from two faults. First, both the argument that refuted the identity of cause and effect and the argument that refuted the difference of cause and effect are applicable to the third alternative as well. The argument refuting the identity of cause and effect is applicable insofar as cause and effect are identical, and the argument refuting their difference is applicable insofar as cause and effect are different. We really have no new proposition in the case of the third alternative. Second, the third alternative is faulty because of the law of contradiction: no phenomenon can have contradictory characteristics. An entity cannot be both existent and nonexistent at once, just as one entity cannot be both red and not red at the same time."
Peter D Santina

4. Fenomena ada tanpa sebab.

__________  -----> D

Dari ga ada apa apa tiba tiba ada....

The final option is that neither self- nor other-causation operates, which position is in effect an indeterminism that denies all causation. If anything were to emerge ever, anywhere, then everything could emerge at all times, everywhere.

Finally, the fourth alternative--the idea that phenomena originate without cause--is rejected by appeal to common experience. For instance, if we set a kettle of water on a lighted stove, the water will boil, but if we set it on a block of ice, it won't. Hence Madhyamaka philosophy concludes that causality according to any one of these four alternatives--from self, from other, from both, and without cause--is impossible. This is the Madhyamaka critique of causality.
Peter D Santina


the Buddha taught that there is no substantial essence underlying and supporting the manifest world.

FOOTNOTE: The reader's attention is called to the etymology of the word "substantial:" the Latin roots are sub = "under" + stare = "to stand." A "substance" is that which stands under something and provides the ground of being for it. The abiding soul and/or an absolute God posited by some schools of thought is, by definition, not dependent upon any element of the world for its existence, and the Buddha's philosophy holds that anything that is not dependent cannot be real. It would either transcend or precede existence, and thus could not exist. Notwithstanding, the mass of humanity perceives and believes in the real existence of the world, all the elements contained therein, and the characteristics of and relations between these elements. Nagarjuna devotes the majority of his sections to an analysis of these aspects of the putative world, such as cause-and-effect, the senses, action, and time. Following this, he examines the Buddha's teachings themselves, focusing on the nature of the enlightened being, the Noble Path, enlightenment itself, and dependent arising.


Referensi:
Nagarjuna's MulaMadhyamaKarika (Foundation Stanzas of Middle Way)
Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness
Atisha's Bodhipathapradipam (Lamp of the Path to Enlightenment)
Pabhongka Rinpoche's "Liberation in Your Hands" Part 3

casuality and emptiness: The Wisdom of Nagarjuna
Dr Peter Della Santina. Ebook Buddhanet

BUDDHISM IN FORTY-EIGHT CHAPTERS : An Introduction to the Major Traditions of Buddhism. Dr Peter Della Santina
http://www.angelfire.com/electronic/bodhidharma/buddhism.html
Thinking in Buddhism:Nagarjuna's Middle Way
http://bahai-library.com/personal/jw/other.pubs/nagarjuna/nag05.html#RTFToC15

Public Teaching Dagpo Rinpoche yg saya ikuti dan diskusi-diskusi yg dilakukan bersama teman-teman sedharma.

Semoga bermanfaat menambah kebijaksanaan.

[xenocross]

dapet text komentar === makin pusing.....

dari: Introduction to the Middle Way
Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara
With commentary by Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche


(a) Autogenesis (Self-Arising)
Here our symbolic opponents are the Samkhya school, which was founded by Kapila, who is thought to have lived in the 7th century BC. It advocates a quite complicated dualistic vision of the universe, starting with the old question, what is the universe made of. It leads on to questions about the true self or, more accurately, telling the true self from that which appears to be self.
According to the Samkhyas, there are two basic categories in the universe: purusha and prakriti.
They say that the history of the world is the history of these two fundamental constituents, which is quite different from Upanishad thought. From this simple dualism develops a very complex set of interrelations between purusha, which is like the spirit of atman, and prakriti, which is like the matter of original nature. The nature of purusha is spirit; it is many spirits. It is being, consciousness. It is limitless, untainted awareness.

The Samkhyas argue that the world is formed as purusha infuses prakriti, and thereby stimulates the three states of prakriti, which are called the three gunas. These are activity (rajas in Sanskrit), inactivity (tamas) and transparency (sattva). This is a very interesting theory – it is the highest Hindu philosophy. If you are not careful when explaining the Buddha nature, you might end up talking about something more like purusha.
The gunas interact and play different parts in the development of prakriti. As prakriti is
activated, it becomes buddhi, or intellect, out of which individual egos evolve. Individuals often confuse their ego with their true self, and liberation can only happen when the true distinction is understood. The true liberation is obtained at death, when the bonds between purusha and prakriti are dissolved.
The Samkhya school also believes strongly in causation. This part is important. They argue for cause, effect and the indestructibility of matter. Scientists say something quite like this. It is known as the theory of existent effect, which means that the effect already exists in the cause of all things. So, in some mysterious way, the cause of something pre-exists its effect, although they are distinct. Consider a jar of clay, for example. The jar is the clay, but it is not the lump of clay.
The basic idea is that what already exists cannot change, and what is not existent cannot be born.
This is a very good idea! What is there cannot be changed into something else, what is not there cannot be born. In a way, it is a dualistic view, and they accept that. They are saying that in that clay, the vase is already there. It is not as though it was clay before and then becomes, or changes into, a vase. They are saying that the pot is in the clay: the effect exists at the same time as the cause. I am sure that if I prepare for a few days and then take the side of the Samkhyas, most of you will end up fumbling with words as you try to attack me. The Samkhyas are a great school, not just a stupid bunch of people!

[xenocross]

[Q]: What happens if the pot breaks?
[A]: Which pot? If you are making another pot with the broken clay, then the other pot already
exists there. Cause and effect exist at the same time. It is known as the theory of the
existent effect. Water has the effect of quenching our thirst. This effect is there, which is
why we drink water. If it did not have the effect of quenching thirst, then no matter how
much water we might drink, it would never quench our thirst. This logic is incredible!
[Q]: Is there a substance that is underneath all this?
[A]: Yes – prakriti, in its three states of rajas, tamas and sattva.
[Q]: But this makes no sense.
[A]: That is good! Because that is exactly what Chandrakirti is saying. You do not need to know
everything about the Samkhya school here; all you need to know is that one of their
essential theories is that the cause already contains the result. Their logic is that what is
existent cannot be changed, and what is not existent cannot be born. So, within the clay,
there must be a pot. If the pot does not already exist there, then it cannot be born. So, no
matter how a potter might try to make a pot, he could never create one.
[Q]: If the effect already exists in the cause, we cannot speak of the theory of causality.
[A]: I am not defending them! We will come to all this shortly.

(i) Reasoning from the commentary (Madhyamakavatara)
[H16] (a) Autogenesis refuted by suchness
[H17] (i) Untenable consequences explicit in the opponent’s statement

I do not know how you are finding things like these syllogisms. You might think that we are
learning new things here, but we are not. We are learning something that we have always done,

but in order to study a philosophy, we have to learn about our normal habits using words and
categories. This is why you might find it difficult.
Even when a cook boils an egg, there is a complete syllogism and a complete inferential logic. If
you have this much water, this much heat and this much fire in the stove, the egg will be cooked
around this time. So now you might ask, why do we need to study this? We need to study this
because we are trying to prove something that cannot be directly cognised, like the fire on the
hill. That is not an object of direct cognition. But if you can see the smoke, then you can say
that there must be fire. This is the syllogism, the inferential logic, and we have drawn
conclusions this way for many centuries. It is similar in this case, when we talk about the
refutation of ‘born from the self’, or autogenesis. However, the root text is very condensed, and
you may find it hard to follow, so I will explain it briefly and then we should have a discussion.

(a) Such genesis would be meaningless (Buddhapalita’s refutation),
6:8.3-4
There is no purpose in something already arisen arising again.
What is already arisen cannot arise again.

Chandrakirti starts to negate self-birth in the third line of the 8th sloka. The third and fourth lines
of the 8th sloka are Buddhapalita’s refutation. He argues that if things are born from the self, then
there is no purpose or benefit to the act of birth. The act of birth is not even necessary if things
are born from the self, because they are already there. As we have seen, the Svatantrikas say that
mental formations are not born from the self because they are existent. You can only have the
idea of birth for something that does not already exist. There was no flower in your garden
before, but now it is being born

Do not think that this is complicated. It is very simple. If something is already there, then it
cannot be produced, because it is already there. If something is born from the self, then there
must already be a self there that is giving birth. And if the self is already there, then what is the
point of being born? The whole purpose of so-called taking birth is that you do not have a child,
so you produce a child. But here, the child is already there. If somebody walks into the tent and
says she has come from the kitchen – that is our ordinary conception. But in this kind of
analysis, she was already here. That coming from the kitchen does not exist. These are hidden
simple aspects of life. They are very simple, but they usually remain hidden in our lives. The
important thing to remember is that the Samkhyas say the result is already there.

The Samkhyas are saying that cause and effect have one essence, and that the cause contains the
result. In the ninth chapter of the Bodhicharyavatara, Shantideva negates this argument, saying
that in this case, when you eat rice, you must be eating shit (9:135.3-4). You might argue that
there is a potential of shit there, and that this is what you are eating. But because the Samkhyas
believe in things being truly existent, they cannot use the word ‘potential’. They believe that
purusha is truly existent, that prakriti is the wealth of the purusha, and that purusha enjoys the
prakriti. Purusha, the atman, is truly and permanent existent, so they cannot even dream of
talking about potential. Words like ‘potential’ belong to the dependent arising school, people
like us.

[xenocross]

(b) No genesis would ever actually occur (Chandrakirti’s refutation),
6:9.1-2
If you truly believe something already created could recreate,
Production such as germination could not occur in ordinary experience.

The first two lines of the 9th sloka are a new negation by Chandrakirti. The Samkhyas say that
cause and effect have one essence, so they are saying that the seed comes from the seed, because
they are one essence. This is another Prasangika method of attack. Since the Samkhyas believe
things have the same essence, they are saying that seed is producing seed. In this case, there will
never be a time with a shoot. The occurrence of shoot can never exist at all, because the time is
totally occupied by the seed.


(ii) Conflicting consequences implicit in the opponent’s statement
[H18] (a) Such genesis would be endless,
6:9.3-4
Or a seed would continue to recreate until the end of existence –
What [sprout] would ever cause it to cease?

The third line is very similar to the first two lines, but concentrating more on the seed. Here the
Samkhyas will have the consequence that the seed will continue forever, so the shoot will not
have a chance to arise. The fourth line is almost like an answer to a question, which is hidden
here. The question, or objection, from the Samkhyas is that when a seed produces a shoot, the
condition of the seed gradually changes because of things like water, earth, moisture and warmth
and so the seed gradually becomes a shoot. Chandrakirti’s answers: how can it destroy itself,
because according to the Samkhyas, the causes and conditions are not separate from the shoot. If
they are separate, their theory is that phenomena are other-born, not self-born

(b) The nature of cause and effect would be mixed up,
6:10.1-2
A sprout different from its instigating seed – with a distinct form,
Colour, flavour, potency and ripening – could then not exist.

The first and second lines of the 10th sloka say that for the Samkhyas who believe in the selfborn,
a consequence will be that the cause and the result will become mixed up. In other words,
he is saying you could never differentiate between the seed and the shoot, in terms of their
colour, flavour, potency or ripening, because they are the same.

(c) Cause and effect would be both different and the same,
6:10.3-4
If the self-substance of the previous vanishes,
As it assumes another nature, what remains of its suchness?

The two next lines are saying something like this. When you make yoghurt, you start with milk.
But when the milk becomes yoghurt, you cannot say that the yoghurt is a different entity from
the milk. You will not find a shoot that is a totally different entity from a seed. Another example
is enlightenment. When you attain enlightenment, we Vajrayana people say things like this
person gets enlightenment, this Buddha nature becomes awakened. The result is already there;
all you need to do is realise this. But because you do not realise this, you create a separation
between cause and effect. And that is delusion, which in turn creates all this illusion.
Chandrakirti’s negation here is in the form of a question. He asks them: if the previous selfsubstance,
such as the seed or milk, vanishes into another nature like yoghurt, then what remains
of its reality or suchness? He is asking them, what remains of the thing that they call self-born?
If something is self-born, then that same suchness must remain, but they have said that it is
already transformed.

[xenocross]

6:11 If in ordinary experience seed is not different from sprout,
You could have perception of neither seed nor sprout.
And, if they were the same, when seeing the sprout,
You should also see the seed. Thus, your thesis is unacceptable.

If the seed is not different from the shoot, then the consequence for the Samkhyas is that in the
same way that they cannot perceive the seed, they also will not see the shoot. Or because they
are the same, then when they see the shoot, they should also see the seed. Now he negates selfborn
even in the relative, conventional truth.

[xenocross]

(b) Autogenesis refuted by ordinary conventional experience,
6:12.1-2
Because a result is seen upon disappearance of the cause,
To say they are the same is not accepted even in ordinary experience.

Even in the ordinary experiences, although the cause such as milk exhausts, we can still see the
result like yoghurt. That’s why even in ordinary experience, ordinary people would not say that
cause and effect are one, because ordinary people would say that it was milk before and it has
now become yoghurt. They would say that they are separate. This is why a thesis that believes
in things being born from the self, such an imputation, cannot be accepted not only in the
ultimate truth, but even in the conventional truth.

[H16] (c) Concluding summary of these two,
6:12.3-4
So-called creation from a self, when properly investigated
Is impossible, in suchness as well as ordinary experience.

[H15] (ii) Reasoning from the commentary (Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarikas),

6:13
If creation arises from a self, it follows that the created, the creator,
The act and the agent all are the same.
As these are not one, this ascertation is impossible,
As there will follow the shortcomings already extensively explained.

In conclusion, if one asserts that things are born from the self, then the one that is created, such
as smoke or shoot, will become the same as the creator, like the fire or the seed. In addition, an
act such as writing, and the agent, the writer, will also become the same. That is not possible,
because there are so many shortcomings that we have already explained.

[xenocross]

[Q]: Can you summarise the problem with the Samkhyas?
[A]: What Chandrakirti is unhappy about is that they are trying to establish a truly existent
phenomenon here, purusha, and a prakriti which is like self-born. So, because you say they
are truly existent phenomena, he refutes them with several different arguments. For
example, they say that things are born from the self. Birth means that you produce
something that you do not already have. Otherwise, what is the point of producing? What
is produced? And if you do not have it already, how can it be born from something you do
not have? If you separate these two words – born and self – there is a contradiction. It is
not only a contradiction; it is meaningless. And it is not only meaningless; it is useless,
because it is already there. But there is a big danger here, because we are trying to make it
sound very simple to attack the Samkhyas, and I do not want to do this. They are very
tough people. Actually, all we need to do is delete the word truly existing, and what they
say makes a lot of sense. For example, they are saying that the conch has a sound. And this
is true. But where they went wrong is that they said it is truly existent. If you were to ask
Chandrakirti “Where does the nice sound of the conch come from?”, then conventionally
speaking, he would say it is dependent arising. Mouth depends on the conch, conch
depends on mouth and sound depends on conch and mouth: dependent arising. But the
Samkhyas want to create a god, purusha, which is a truly existent creator. That is where
they went wrong.
[Q]: If we use ordinary conventional experience to refute the Samkhya argument, then why don’t
we accept other-arising as true, since this is accepted by ordinary conventional experience?
[A]: You will see when come to discuss the other-born. Today, our hero said that self-born is not
accepted by ordinary people. But tomorrow, when we talk about other-born, he will say that
ordinary people would say “I planted this tree”, “I planted this son in my wife’s womb”:
they do not accept the other-born. He will slip to the other side again! Ordinary people are
like Madhyamika people: they are flexible, and they do not analyse. The only difference is
that ordinary people just accept a certain reality, but the Madhyamikas analyse and find out
that things are dependent arising. Ordinary people do not have a path, but the Madhyamikas
have a path.
[Q]: I think we are misrepresenting the Samkhya position. We are analysing things that they say
do not truly exist as if they truly exist. It seems to me that they are saying that Atman truly
exists. When they say that all these phenomena are born from self, it is just a linguistic
convention of theirs. What they mean is exactly what you mean. Things cannot actually be
born from the self; they are an illusion. It seems as if they are born from the self, and it
seems as if they have a separate nature, but in fact, they do not. They are all the Atman. So,
we have separated their argument, and we are agreeing with them while also trying to show
that they are absurd.
[A]: The only trouble here is the truly existing. They believe in truly existent Atman, whereas
we do not believe in truly existent emptiness or dependent arising.
[Q]: But they say that atman is limitless. It has no beginning, so it was not born.
[A]: But that is self-contradictory. They cannot both say that atman truly exists and that it is
limitless.
[Q]: Can you explain how they understand time?
[A]: They say that time is illusion; it is maya. They are only slightly different from buddhism, I
think. In the Vajrayana, the Samkhyas are so highly praised that their view actually
qualifies as a defilement that needs to be purified by the first initiation, the vase initiation.
They are very high.
[Q]: Do the bodhisattvas have the view that we are trying to establish here?
[A]: A bodhisattva on the sixth bhumi does not have the three fetters, and because of that, he
does not have the clinging to the view of the Samkhya school. But nor does he have
clinging to the view of the Madhyamika school, because he does not have clinging to any
view. But right now, we are establishing a view for ordinary people like us. We are
gradually beginning to establish a view by negating the four corners of birth from self,

[xenocross]

other, both, and neither. Today we are starting by negating the first corner, which is selfborn.
[Q]: But what about when we talk about the bodhisattva seeing the gift, the giver and the
recipient all as empty?
[A]: That is totally different. The key here is truly existent. Bodhisattvas do not believe in truly
existent emptiness. So, a bodhisattva understands the unity of these three by understanding
that the three do not truly exist. This is why they cannot become one. For the Samkhyas,
although they are also trying to say that they are all one, the difficulty is that they say they
are based on truly existent purusha and prakriti. This is the problem.
I think that the theory of self-born is actually quite difficult to communicate. Most of the time, if
we are students of a philosophy, science, technology or whatever, we are usually more oriented
towards the other-born. The self-born theory is almost something religious. I do not think that
scientists talk about self-born, do they? Scientists do not have this problem of truly existent, do
they? Of course, they still cling to truly existent emotions, but they do not try say that these are
theoretically established.
Let me give a simple example. I am. I have a clinging to a truly existent self. I am true. I am
not like a rainbow; I feel pain when something hits me, I have emotions. Then I start a school,
and after much analysis, I found that I am truly existent. That is a theory. It is the worst kind,
because you already have your own share of problems, but now you are creating a new problem
for yourself.
Chandrakirti has compassion towards the kind of ignorance like feeling ‘I am truly existent’. He
has very gentle compassion, and he gives us a path for this – compassion, bodhicitta and so on.
But if I have created an idea or ideology of ‘I’, he has a very wrathful compassion. He does not
teach me compassion or give me any meditation instructions. First, he will use my own logic
and defeat me. He will show that my establishment of this self is wrong. Ordinary people do not
share the ideas of the Samkhyas. Do you think that you are purusha? No, you think you are
John, or whatever. Scientists fall into this second category.
[Q]: But modern science is showing that the mind depends on the brain.
[A]: If you say that brain is mind, I will accept that. Buddha also said it. Brain is part of the
kamsum (khams gsum), the three realms. Buddha said everything is mind, so brain has to be
mind! But mind is not brain; there is a difference. There is a problem if you think that
mind is brain. Let us suppose that the brain presently sitting in your head, and all its brain
cells, are all in good condition. And then I show you six objects in front of your head.
There is no sickness and no dysfunction, and there are six objects, so the brain has to
perceive all six objects simultaneously. But the brain chooses not to see all of them, and
that choice comes from habitual patterns. This demonstrates that mind is not brain (see
discussion starting on p.240).
[Q]: The brain is a systemic organ. Science has shown that habitual patterns are created while
young people are growing up, so what you are saying is not necessarily true.
[A]: All right. We will come to this during other-production anyway. Debating with scientists is
so difficult, because they do not have an established view! They are always changing their
view, every century, every year, even every time they have a conference! When the Buddha
taught the reality of the phenomena, he said that even before the Buddha came to this earth,
it was like this. And even after all the buddhas have gone, it will still be like this. Even if
buddhas are teaching something completely wrong, reality will never change. We do not
need conferences; we do not need discussions. It is there, it has been like this, it is going to
be like this and it is like this right now.
[Q]: But who is there to say this?
[A]: Nobody has to be there to say this. That reality is simply dependent arising.

[djoe]

 [at] xenocross

ada pdf nya gak??? Introduction to the Middle Way Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara

[xenocross]

bisa donlod
siddharthasintent.org/community/pdf/MadhyamakavataraDJKR.pdf‎

[djoe]

bisa donlod
siddharthasintent.org/community/pdf/MadhyamakavataraDJKR.pdf‎

Bro ada gak pdf Mulamadhyamaka-Karika dari Chandrakirti (Prasannapada)

Saya mencari Mulamadhyamaka lain sebagai pembanding

[xenocross]

Candrakirti 1979 - Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way ; Essential Prasannapada Tr Mervyn Sprung

Long out of print, not yet superseded, Sprung's careful and erudite translation, a culmination of his career, focuses on philosophical clarity. Translated from the Sanskrit (not the Tibetan translation), this is an essential work on Buddhist insight, different from the more common Candrakirti 'Entering the Path' of Tibetan path literature and commentary.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/95463567/Candrakirti-1979-Lucid-Exposition-of-the-Middle-Way-Essential-Prasannapada-Tr-Mervyn-Sprung

[djoe]

Candrakirti 1979 - Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way ; Essential Prasannapada Tr Mervyn Sprung

Long out of print, not yet superseded, Sprung's careful and erudite translation, a culmination of his career, focuses on philosophical clarity. Translated from the Sanskrit (not the Tibetan translation), this is an essential work on Buddhist insight, different from the more common Candrakirti 'Entering the Path' of Tibetan path literature and commentary.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/95463567/Candrakirti-1979-Lucid-Exposition-of-the-Middle-Way-Essential-Prasannapada-Tr-Mervyn-Sprung

mau cari yang free ada gak?

Kalau yang ini ada yg punya free pdfnya gak?
Aryadeva's Four Hundred Stanzas On The Middle Way: With Commentary By Gyel-Tsap (Textual Studies and Translations in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism)

[xenocross]

gak punya. Kalau mau download scribbd titip aja ke aku link nya, ntar aku usahakan dapetin.

nih yg candrakirti aku masukin mediaapi
http://www.mediafire.com/view/nf2fr7xbm4bq26r/95463567-Candrakirti-1979-Lucid-Exposition-of-the-Middle-Way-Essential-Prasannapada-Tr-Mervyn-Sprung.pdf

[dilbert]

Middle Way dari way-way (jalan-jalan) yang mana ?

[K.K.]

Middle Way dari way-way (jalan-jalan) yang mana ?

Middle way dari way-way nge-trend saat itu yang membahas tentang eksistensi sejati (bhava). Golongan Abhidharmik (termasuk Theravada) membahas adanya realitas sejati yang tidak tergantung pada kesepakatan konvensional, merujuk pada svabhava (atau sabhava dalam Pali, yang tidak muncul dalam nikaya awal, namun muncul belakangan dalam Milindapanha dan Nettipakarana, dan Visuddhimagga).

Nagarjuna mengatakan karena semua fenomena muncul bergantungan, tidak ada satu sifat sejati dari unsur karena bergantung pada lainnya untuk timbul, maka no bhava, no abhava, no svabhava, no parabhava, semuanya adalah sunya, muncul bergantungan, dan lenyap pula ketika kondisinya lenyap. 

[djoe]

gak punya. Kalau mau download scribbd titip aja ke aku link nya, ntar aku usahakan dapetin.

nih yg candrakirti aku masukin mediaapi
http://www.mediafire.com/view/nf2fr7xbm4bq26r/95463567-Candrakirti-1979-Lucid-Exposition-of-the-Middle-Way-Essential-Prasannapada-Tr-Mervyn-Sprung.pdf

Thanks bangettt bro. 
Buku ini cuma sampai chapter 19 aja yah bro atau ada jilid ke duanya???

[dilbert]

Middle way dari way-way nge-trend saat itu yang membahas tentang eksistensi sejati (bhava). Golongan Abhidharmik (termasuk Theravada) membahas adanya realitas sejati yang tidak tergantung pada kesepakatan konvensional, merujuk pada svabhava (atau sabhava dalam Pali, yang tidak muncul dalam nikaya awal, namun muncul belakangan dalam Milindapanha dan Nettipakarana, dan Visuddhimagga).

Nagarjuna mengatakan karena semua fenomena muncul bergantungan, tidak ada satu sifat sejati dari unsur karena bergantung pada lainnya untuk timbul, maka no bhava, no abhava, no svabhava, no parabhava, semuanya adalah sunya, muncul bergantungan, dan lenyap pula ketika kondisinya lenyap. 

emang-nya "Theravada" pada saat itu sudah tidak berdasarkan pada anattalakkhana sutta ?

[xenocross]

Thanks bangettt bro. 
Buku ini cuma sampai chapter 19 aja yah bro atau ada jilid ke duanya???

judulnya kan bab-bab esensial, jadi mungkin memang gak semua diterjemahin.

Middle-way disini mengacu pada konteks debat filosofis waktu itu, dimana ada banyak teori termasuk teori non-buddhis.
Dan semuanya dihancurkan oleh Nagarjuna dengan doktrin "Sunyata"

[xenocross]

emang-nya "Theravada" pada saat itu sudah tidak berdasarkan pada anattalakkhana sutta ?

At this point some general introductory remarks concerning Nāgār juna’s goals and strategies might not be amiss. In MMK Nāgārjuna is addressing an audience of fellow Buddhists. (In the other work generally accepted as by Nāgārjuna, the
Vigrahavyāvartanī , his interlocutors also include members of the non-Buddhist Nyāya school.) Of particular importance is the fact that his audience holds views that are based on the fundamental presuppositions behind the Abhidharma enterprise. Abhidharma is that part of the Buddhist philosophical tradition that aims at filling out the metaphysical details behind the Buddha’s core teachings of nonself, impermanence, and suffering. A number of different Abhidharma schools arose out of significant controversies concerning these details. They held in common, however, a core set of presuppositions, which may be roughly sketched as follows:

1.There are two ways in which a statement may be true, conventionally and ultimately.
a. To say of a statement that it is conventionally true is to say that action based on its acceptance reliably leads to successful practice. Our commonsense convictions concerning ourselves and the world are for the most part conventionally true, since they reflect conventions that have been found to be useful in everyday practice.

b. To say of a statement that it is ultimately true is to say that it corresponds to the nature of reality and neither asserts nor presupposes the existence of any mere conceptual fiction. A conceptual fiction is something that is thought to exist only because of facts about us concept-users and the concepts that we happen to employ. For instance, a chariot is a conceptual fiction. When a set of parts is assembled in the right way, we only believe there is a chariot in addition to the parts because of facts about our interests and our cognitive limitations: We have an interest in assemblages that facilitate transportation, and we would have trouble listing all the parts and all their connections. The ultimate truth is absolutely objective; it reflects the way the world is independently of what happens to be useful for us. No statement
about a chariot could be ultimately true (or ultimately false).

2. Only dharmas are ultimately real.
a. To say of something that it is ultimately real is to say that it is the sort of thing about which ultimately true (or false) statements may be made. An ultimately real entity is unlike a mere conceptual fiction in that it may be said to exist independently of facts about us.

b. The ultimately real dharmas are simple or impartite. They are not products of the mind’s tendency to aggregate for purposes of conceptual economy. They are what remain when all products of such activity have been analytically resolved into their basic constituents. They may include such things as indivisible material particles, spatio-temporally discrete occurrences of color and shape, pain sensations, particular occurrences of basic desires such as hunger and thirst, and individual moments of consciousness. (Different Abhidharma schools give somewhat different accounts of what dharmas there are.)

c. All the facts about our commonsense world of people, towns, forests, chariots, and the like can be explained entirely in terms of facts about the dharmas and their relations with one another.
The conventional truth can be explained entirely in terms of the ultimate truth.

3. Dharmas originate in dependence on causes and conditions.
While not all Abhidharma schools hold that all dharmas are subject to dependent origination ( pratītyasamutpāda), all agree that most dharmas are. And since anything subject to origination is also subject to cessation, most (or all) dharmas are also impermanent.

4. Dharmas have intrinsic nature (svabhāva).
a. An intrinsic nature is a property that is intrinsic to its bearer—that is, the fact that the property characterizes that entity is independent of facts about anything else.

b. Only dharmas have intrinsic nature. The size and shape of a chariot are not intrinsic natures of the chariot, since the chariot’s having its size and shape depends on the size, shape, and arrangement of its parts. The size and shape of the chariot are instead extrinsic natures (parabhāva) since they are not the “its own” of the chariot but are rather borrowed.

c. Dharmas have only intrinsic natures. A characteristic that a thing can have only by virtue of its relation to another thing (such as the characteristic of being taller than Mont Blanc) is not intrinsic to the thing that has it. To suppose that the thing nonetheless has that characteristic is to allow mental construction to play a role in our conception of that which is real. For it requires us to suppose that a thing can have a complex nature: an intrinsic nature—what it itself is like apart from everything else—plus those properties it gets by virtue of its relations to other things.
To the extent that this nature is complex, it is conceptually constructed by the mind’s aggregative tendencies.

d. A given dharma has only one intrinsic nature. Since dharmas are what remain at the end of analysis, and analysis dissolves the aggregating that is contributed by mental construction, a given dharma can have only one intrinsic nature.

5. Suffering is overcome by coming to realize the ultimate truth about ourselves and the world.
a. Suffering results from the false belief that there is an enduring “I,” the subject of experience and agent of actions, for which events in a life can have meaning.

b. This false belief results from failure to see that the person is a mere conceptual fiction, something lacking intrinsic nature. What is ultimately real is just a causal series of dharmas. Suffering is overcome by coming to see reality in a genuinely objective way, a way that does not project any conceptual fictions onto the world.

Nāgārjuna does not deny that this is what dharmas would be like.
Instead he rejects the further implication that there actually are dharmas. His position is that if there were ultimately real things, they would be dharmas, things with intrinsic nature; but there cannot be such things. Not only are the person and other partite things devoid of intrinsic nature and so mere conceptual fictions, the same holds for dharmas as well. This is what it means to say that all things are empty.
Given the nature of this claim, there can be no single argument that could establish it. Such a “master argument” would have to be based on claims about the ultimate natures of things, and given what would be required to establish that such claims are ultimately true, this would involve commitment to intrinsic natures of some sort or other. Nāgārjuna’s strategy is instead to examine a variety of claims made by those who take there to be ultimately real entities and seek to show of each such claim that it cannot be true. Indeed the commentators introduce each chapter as addressing the objection of an opponent to the conclusion of the preceding chapter. The expectation is that once opponents have seen sufficiently many of their central theses refuted, they will acknowledge that further attempts at finding the ultimate truth are likely to prove fruitless.

http://www.wisdompubs.org/sites/default/files/preview/Nagarjuna%27s-Middle-Way-Book-Preview-R.pdf

[K.K.]

emang-nya "Theravada" pada saat itu sudah tidak berdasarkan pada anattalakkhana sutta ?

Ga ada hubungan dengan Anattalakkhanasutta kali...

[dilbert]

Middle way dari way-way nge-trend saat itu yang membahas tentang eksistensi sejati (bhava). Golongan Abhidharmik (termasuk Theravada) membahas adanya realitas sejati yang tidak tergantung pada kesepakatan konvensional, merujuk pada svabhava (atau sabhava dalam Pali, yang tidak muncul dalam nikaya awal, namun muncul belakangan dalam Milindapanha dan Nettipakarana, dan Visuddhimagga).

di-bagian mana di milinda panha yang menyatakan ada realitas sejati ?

[K.K.]

di-bagian mana di milinda panha yang menyatakan ada realitas sejati ?

Bagian kesempurnaan Buddha, mengenai 28 manfaat pengasingan diri, salah satunya: "sankharanam sabhavam dassayati", memahami realitas sejati bentukan.

[dilbert]

Bagian kesempurnaan Buddha, mengenai 28 manfaat pengasingan diri, salah satunya: "sankharanam sabhavam dassayati", memahami realitas sejati bentukan.

saya kalau naik pesawat, sering baca-baca kembali milinda panha... coba quote-kan yang lebih panjang di bagian mana yang membahas soal "memahami realitas sejati bentukan" ?


------------------------

Sudah saya dapatkan apa yang dimaksud...

Bab IX...

9. Kesempurnaan Sang Buddha

“Jika Sang Tathagata telah mencapai segalanya di bawah pohon bodhi, mengapa Beliau menghabiskan waktu tiga bulan lagi di dalam kesendirian?”31
“O, baginda, meditasi kesendirian mempunyai banyak manfaat. Semua Tathagata mencapai kebuddhaan lewat cara itu dan kemudian mengajarkan hal itu demi manfaat umat manusia. Ada dua puluh delapan manfaat praktek kesendirian:32

meditasi itu melindungi seseorang;
memperpanjang usia kehidupannya;
memberikan semangat;
mengikis kelemahannya;
menghilangkan segala reputasi yang buruk, dan
membawa kemasyhuran;
menghancurkan ketidakpuasan, dan
menumbuhkan kepuasan;
menghapuskan ketakutan, dan
memberikan keyakinan;
menghilangkan kemalasan, dan
memenuhinya dengan semangat;
mengusir nafsu,
mengusir niat jahat, dan
mengusir pandangan salah;
melemahkan kesombongan;
menghalau keraguan, dan
membuat pikiran terpusat;
melembutkan pikiran, dan
membuatnya ringan hati;
membuatnya serius;
membawa banyak keuntungan;
membuatnya patut dihormati;
memberikan sukacita;
mengisinya dengan kegembiraan;
menunjukkan kepadanya sifat sejati semua bentukan;
mengakhiri kelahiran kembali; dan
memberikan kepadanya semua buah dari kehidupan meninggalkan duniawi.
Karena Sang Tathagata mengetahui berbagai keuntungan ini maka Beliau menjalankan praktek kesendirian.
“Dan seluruhnya ada empat alasan mengapa Para Tathagata membaktikan diri pada praktek kesendirian:

agar dapat berdiam di dalam ketenangan;
karena sifat kesendirian yang sama sekali tak tercela;
karena kesendirian merupakan jalan bagi semua yang luhur tanpa kecuali; dan
karena hal itu dipuji dan dimuliakan oleh semua Buddha.
Bukan karena masih ada yang harus dicapai oleh Para Buddha itu, dan bukan pula karena masih ada sesuatu yang perlu ditambahkan pada apa yang telah Mereka capai, melainkan hanya karena manfaat-manfaat yang luar biasa itulah maka Para Buddha mempraktekkan kesendirian.”

-------------


26. menunjukkan kepadanya sifat sejati semua bentukan (sankharanam sabhavam dassayati)
-- Sifat sejati semua bentukan (sankhara) = bersifat anicca, sehingga ketika dilekati akan menghasilkan dukkha, dan semua fenomena di dunia ini adalah anatta (atau bersifat sankhara).

Sabbe sankhara anicca
Sabbe sankhara dukkha
Sabbe dhamma anatta...

---------------

Bagaimana bisa menafsirkan bagian milinda panha ini sebagai pengertian bahwa ada-nya realitas sejati

[K.K.]

saya kalau naik pesawat, sering baca-baca kembali milinda panha... coba quote-kan yang lebih panjang di bagian mana yang membahas soal "memahami realitas sejati bentukan" ?


------------------------

Sudah saya dapatkan apa yang dimaksud...

Bab IX...

9. Kesempurnaan Sang Buddha

“Jika Sang Tathagata telah mencapai segalanya di bawah pohon bodhi, mengapa Beliau menghabiskan waktu tiga bulan lagi di dalam kesendirian?”31
“O, baginda, meditasi kesendirian mempunyai banyak manfaat. Semua Tathagata mencapai kebuddhaan lewat cara itu dan kemudian mengajarkan hal itu demi manfaat umat manusia. Ada dua puluh delapan manfaat praktek kesendirian:32

meditasi itu melindungi seseorang;
memperpanjang usia kehidupannya;
memberikan semangat;
mengikis kelemahannya;
menghilangkan segala reputasi yang buruk, dan
membawa kemasyhuran;
menghancurkan ketidakpuasan, dan
menumbuhkan kepuasan;
menghapuskan ketakutan, dan
memberikan keyakinan;
menghilangkan kemalasan, dan
memenuhinya dengan semangat;
mengusir nafsu,
mengusir niat jahat, dan
mengusir pandangan salah;
melemahkan kesombongan;
menghalau keraguan, dan
membuat pikiran terpusat;
melembutkan pikiran, dan
membuatnya ringan hati;
membuatnya serius;
membawa banyak keuntungan;
membuatnya patut dihormati;
memberikan sukacita;
mengisinya dengan kegembiraan;
menunjukkan kepadanya sifat sejati semua bentukan;
mengakhiri kelahiran kembali; dan
memberikan kepadanya semua buah dari kehidupan meninggalkan duniawi.
Karena Sang Tathagata mengetahui berbagai keuntungan ini maka Beliau menjalankan praktek kesendirian.
“Dan seluruhnya ada empat alasan mengapa Para Tathagata membaktikan diri pada praktek kesendirian:

agar dapat berdiam di dalam ketenangan;
karena sifat kesendirian yang sama sekali tak tercela;
karena kesendirian merupakan jalan bagi semua yang luhur tanpa kecuali; dan
karena hal itu dipuji dan dimuliakan oleh semua Buddha.
Bukan karena masih ada yang harus dicapai oleh Para Buddha itu, dan bukan pula karena masih ada sesuatu yang perlu ditambahkan pada apa yang telah Mereka capai, melainkan hanya karena manfaat-manfaat yang luar biasa itulah maka Para Buddha mempraktekkan kesendirian.”

-------------


26. menunjukkan kepadanya sifat sejati semua bentukan (sankharanam sabhavam dassayati)
-- Sifat sejati semua bentukan (sankhara) = bersifat anicca, sehingga ketika dilekati akan menghasilkan dukkha, dan semua fenomena di dunia ini adalah anatta (atau bersifat sankhara).

Sabbe sankhara anicca
Sabbe sankhara dukkha
Sabbe dhamma anatta...

---------------

Bagaimana bisa menafsirkan bagian milinda panha ini sebagai pengertian bahwa ada-nya realitas sejati

Seharusnya saya yang tanya, darimana "sabhava" ditafsirkan "anicca-dukkha-anatta"? Itu mah tilakkhana kali.

Selanjutnya tanya aja sama bang Xenocross deh yah... Saya takut ntar dipanggilin Mingun Sayadaw lagi...

[dilbert]

Seharusnya saya yang tanya, darimana "sabhava" ditafsirkan "anicca-dukkha-anatta"? Itu mah tilakkhana kali.

Selanjutnya tanya aja sama bang Xenocross deh yah... Saya takut ntar dipanggilin Mingun Sayadaw lagi...

69. 'And there are, O king, these twenty and eight good qualities of meditation in the perception of which the Tathâgatas devoted themselves to it. And which are they? Meditation preserves him who meditates, it gives him long life, and endows him with power, it cleanses him from faults, it removes from him any bad reputation giving him a good name, it destroys discontent in him filling him with content, it releases him from all fear endowing him with confidence, it removes sloth far from him filling him with zeal, it takes away lust and ill-will and dullness, it puts an end to pride, it breaks down all doubt, it makes his heart to be at peace, it softens his mind, [140] it makes him glad, it makes him grave, it gains him much advantage, it makes him worthy of reverence, it fills him with joy, it fills him with delight, it shows him the transitory nature of all compounded things, it puts an end to rebirth, it obtains for him all the benefits of renunciation. These, O king, are the twenty and eight virtues of meditation on the perception of which the Tathâgatas devote themselves to it. But it is because...

--------------------------
Dengan hanya kata sabhavam saja di milinda panha, langsung diterjemahkan / di-tafsirkan ada pembahasan di milinda panha tentang realitas sejati...

di-hampir semua terjemahan.... "sankharanam sabhavam dassayati" di-terjemahkan kira-kira dengan makna "it shows him the transitory nature of all compounded things" / "menunjukkan kepadanya sifat sejati semua bentukan"

[K.K.]

69. 'And there are, O king, these twenty and eight good qualities of meditation in the perception of which the Tathâgatas devoted themselves to it. And which are they? Meditation preserves him who meditates, it gives him long life, and endows him with power, it cleanses him from faults, it removes from him any bad reputation giving him a good name, it destroys discontent in him filling him with content, it releases him from all fear endowing him with confidence, it removes sloth far from him filling him with zeal, it takes away lust and ill-will and dullness, it puts an end to pride, it breaks down all doubt, it makes his heart to be at peace, it softens his mind, [140] it makes him glad, it makes him grave, it gains him much advantage, it makes him worthy of reverence, it fills him with joy, it fills him with delight, it shows him the transitory nature of all compounded things, it puts an end to rebirth, it obtains for him all the benefits of renunciation. These, O king, are the twenty and eight virtues of meditation on the perception of which the Tathâgatas devote themselves to it. But it is because...

--------------------------
Dengan hanya kata sabhavam saja di milinda panha, langsung diterjemahkan / di-tafsirkan ada pembahasan di milinda panha tentang realitas sejati...

di-hampir semua terjemahan.... "sankharanam sabhavam dassayati" di-terjemahkan kira-kira dengan makna "it shows him the transitory nature of all compounded things" / "menunjukkan kepadanya sifat sejati semua bentukan"

Realitas sejati, sifat sejati, dll, itu hanya terjemahan saja. Saya tidak permasalahkan terjemahan. Coba cari doktrin "sabhava" itu, dan pelajarilah dahulu, jangan pakai asumsi "gue udah tahu pasti maksudnya anicca-dukkha-anatta" dan langsung asbun. Kalau belajar perkembangan doktrin Theravada saja tidak mau, bagaimana mau mengerti doktrin tandingan lainnya dan madhyamaka-nya Nagarjuna?

Maaf, tapi kalau post berikutnya kita masih tidak nyambung tentang doktrin sabhava, saya tidak akan tanggapi lagi yah.

[dilbert]

Realitas sejati, sifat sejati, dll, itu hanya terjemahan saja. Saya tidak permasalahkan terjemahan. Coba cari doktrin "sabhava" itu, dan pelajarilah dahulu, jangan pakai asumsi "gue udah tahu pasti maksudnya anicca-dukkha-anatta" dan langsung asbun. Kalau belajar perkembangan doktrin Theravada saja tidak mau, bagaimana mau mengerti doktrin tandingan lainnya dan madhyamaka-nya Nagarjuna?

Maaf, tapi kalau post berikutnya kita masih tidak nyambung tentang doktrin sabhava, saya tidak akan tanggapi lagi yah.

ente yang kata-kan bahwa apa yang tercantum di milinda panha itu doktrin sabhava, padahal yang ada di bab Kesempurnaan Sang Buddha adalah berbeda... tidak ada konteks membahas doktrin sabhava... dan diberbagai terjemahan, tidak ada di-bahas soal doktrin sabhava...

-----------------

Jadi inget anggapan "cocoklogi" abhidhamma di bhikkhuni vibhanga (vinaya), tapi kok bisa yah muncul penggunaan "cocoklogi" soal sabhava di Milinda panha.... (cuma 1 kata saja), dan tidak nyambung soal doktrin sabhava yang dimaksud-kan sebagai realitas sejati....

[xenocross]

Milinda Panha beberapa kali menyebut kata "sabhava" tetapi waktu itu belum masuk ke doktrin svabhava yang umum ditemui di abhidharma kemudian. Saya kurang tahu, tapi mungkin itu menandakan cikal bakal berkembangnya doktrin svabhava

doktrin svabhava dalam buddhisme misalnya dianut oleh Sarvastivada yang mengatakan: Semua dharma di tiga masa sesungguhnya  ada

The Sarvāstivāda (Sanskrit: सर्वास्तिवाद sarvāstivāda; traditional Chinese: 說一切有部; pinyin: Shuō Yīqièyǒu Bù) were an early school of Buddhism that held to 'the existence of all dharmas in the past, present and future, the 'three times'. Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya states:

    25c-d. He who affirms the existence of the dharmas of the three time periods [past, present and future] is held to be a Sarvastivadin

di theravada, ada di karya komentar vissudhi magga yang sering menyebut sabhava

QUOTE
"While a dhamma is a truly existent thing (sabhavasiddha), a pannatti is a thing merely conceptualized (parikappasiddha). The former is an existent verifiable by its own distinctive intrinsic characteristic... The latter, being a product of the mind's synthetic function, exists only by virtue of thought."


To which could be added that the significance of this distinction lies in the question of what may and may not be the object of insight development. As the Visuddhi-Magga explains at the beginning of the section dealing with Understanding (panna) (Ch XIV):

QUOTE
'What are is characteristic, function etc? Understanding has the characteristic of penetrating the individual essences [sabhava] of states [dhammas]. Its function is to abolish the darkness of delusion, which conceals the individual essences of states.' XIV, 7
http://www.abhidhamma.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=140

Dan biarpun dikatakan "sungguh ada", konsep svabhava buddhis masih mengatakan anatta dan anicca. Berbeda dengan non-buddhis yang mengatakan atta = svabhava.
Semakin dibaca semakin pusing.

Bro Dilbert, adalah baik untuk belajar filosofi Nagarjuna ini. Di masa lalu ada sekian banyak aliran Buddhis dan aliran agama lain, mereka saling berdebat. Tahu kan debat antar agama di india zaman dulu itu seperti semacam kompetisi.

Begitu Nagarjuna datang dengan filosofi madhyamika ini, filosofi ini mendominasi diskusi di India Utara selama minimal 400 tahun. Di Tibet, dikatakan filosofi ini adalah puncak semua filosofi.

Trus masalah praktikal nya, pikiran kita secara halus selalu melihat diri dan benda lain "ada" secara intrinsik, berdiri sendiri, mempunyai "atta"
Dan ini terjadi dalam 4 cara utama yang disebut nagarjuna
- dilahirkan oleh dirinya sendiri (svabhava A disebabkan svabhava A)
- disebabkan oleh svabhava benda lain (svabhava A menyebabkan svabhava B)
- oleh diri sendiri dan benda lain (campuran yg pertama dan kedua)
- terjadi tanpa sebab ( dari tiada tiba2 ada svabhava A)

Jadi memahami ini secara intelektual adalah suatu langkah merealisasi anatta

[seniya]

Milinda Panha beberapa kali menyebut kata "sabhava" tetapi waktu itu belum masuk ke doktrin svabhava yang umum ditemui di abhidharma kemudian. Saya kurang tahu, tapi mungkin itu menandakan cikal bakal berkembangnya doktrin svabhava

doktrin svabhava dalam buddhisme misalnya dianut oleh Sarvastivada yang mengatakan: Semua dharma di tiga masa sesungguhnya  ada
di theravada, ada di karya komentar vissudhi magga yang sering menyebut sabhava
Dan biarpun dikatakan "sungguh ada", konsep svabhava buddhis masih mengatakan anatta dan anicca. Berbeda dengan non-buddhis yang mengatakan atta = svabhava.
Semakin dibaca semakin pusing.

Setahuku memang yang ditentang Nagarjuna dengan filosofi Madhyamaka adalah ajaran svabhava dari Abhidharma Sarvastivada:

Selain itu, Sarvastivada mengajarkan svabhava (sifat intrinsik fenomena) yang tidak berubah selama tiga periode waktu; svabhava inilah yang membedakan secara unik satu fenomena dengan fenomena lainnya. Menurut Sarvastivada, ini bukan berarti sifat fenomena (dhamma) adalah kekal sehingga menyalahi hukum ketidakkekalan (anicca/anitya), tetapi fenomena tetap tunduk pada kemunculan dan kelenyapan, hanya saja sifat intrinsiknya tidak berubah sepanjang waktu, seperti emas yang berubah bentuk menjadi perhiasan, mangkuk, dst, entitas/sifat intrinsik emas tersebut tidak berubah walaupun mengalami perubahan bentuk. Ajaran inilah yang ditentang banyak aliran lainnya karena seakan-akan menyatakan adanya suatu inti yang kekal dalam fenomena sehingga menyalahi ajaran bukan aku (anatta/anatman). Untuk menyanggah ajaran svabhava ini, aliran Mahayana yang muncul kemudian mengajarkan bahwa sifat intrinsik semua fenomena adalah kosong (sunyata svabhava). Inilah cikal bakal ajaran kekosongan yang terkenal dalam Mahayana saat ini.

Sumber: Sarvastivada Abhidharma

[K.K.]

ente yang kata-kan bahwa apa yang tercantum di milinda panha itu doktrin sabhava, padahal yang ada di bab Kesempurnaan Sang Buddha adalah berbeda... tidak ada konteks membahas doktrin sabhava... dan diberbagai terjemahan, tidak ada di-bahas soal doktrin sabhava...

-----------------

Jadi inget anggapan "cocoklogi" abhidhamma di bhikkhuni vibhanga (vinaya), tapi kok bisa yah muncul penggunaan "cocoklogi" soal sabhava di Milinda panha.... (cuma 1 kata saja), dan tidak nyambung soal doktrin sabhava yang dimaksud-kan sebagai realitas sejati....

Dalam Milindapanha memang tidak ada penjelasan detailnya soal doktrin sabhava, tapi kata itu muncul sesuai perkembangan doktrin saat itu, maka bisa dilihat dalam nikaya awal tidak ada penyebutan sabhava sama sekali, tapi setelah perkembangan doktrin sabhava (di India dulu perdebatan dan argumentasi sangat umum, saling menyerang dan bertahan dengan tesis masing-masing), barulah pengertian itu dimasukkan dalam tafsir abhidhamma dan istilahnya kembali muncul dalam doktrin belakangan seperti Milindapanha tersebut.

Berbeda dengan cocoklogi term "Abhidhamma" di vinaya dengan "Abhidhamma Pitaka", yang pada jaman Buddha jelas-jelas belum ada. (Kecuali menurut catatan sektarian Theravada, tentunya hehehe)

Lucunya, saya baca perkembangan doktrin sabhava di forum diskusi abhidhamma yang juga melibatkan tulisan bhikkhu Theravada. Melihat pengetahuan dan cara bicara bro dilbert yang makin lama makin kelihatan aslinya, saya sudah pada kesimpulan tidak ada gunanya melanjutkan diskusi. Jadi maaf kalau berikutnya saya tidak tanggapi yah.

[K.K.]

Milinda Panha beberapa kali menyebut kata "sabhava" tetapi waktu itu belum masuk ke doktrin svabhava yang umum ditemui di abhidharma kemudian. Saya kurang tahu, tapi mungkin itu menandakan cikal bakal berkembangnya doktrin svabhava

Svabhava bukan doktrin khusus sekte tertentu seperti Theravada, tapi setiap sekte punya pandangan tersendiri tentang svabhava, dan sekte-sekte Abhidharmik justru memang membahas svabhava ini dalam tafsir abhidharmanya. Svabhava ini yang membahas karakteristik mendasar fenomena yang muncul, yang kemudian berinteraksi dengan fenomena lainnya membentuk samskara/bentukan.

doktrin svabhava dalam buddhisme misalnya dianut oleh Sarvastivada yang mengatakan: Semua dharma di tiga masa sesungguhnya  ada
di theravada, ada di karya komentar vissudhi magga yang sering menyebut sabhava
Dan biarpun dikatakan "sungguh ada", konsep svabhava buddhis masih mengatakan anatta dan anicca. Berbeda dengan non-buddhis yang mengatakan atta = svabhava.
Semakin dibaca semakin pusing.

Betul, bahkan pudgalavada yang memiliki pandangan ada 'pudgala' yang bukan sama bukan berbeda dengan pancaskandha saja memegang "anicca-dukkha-anatta", semua sekte awal ini menerima dan memegang prinsip doktrin Buddhisme Awal, namun mereka menafsirkannya dengan cara berbeda saja.

Perbedaan yang bisa dilihat adalah kalau di Theravada fenomena dianalisis dan dipecah menjadi fenomena yang lebih kecil, kemudian dipecah lagi menjadi yang lebih kecil sampai akhirnya ada satu bagian yang tidak lagi terbagi. Nah fenomena ini yang kemudian memiliki ciri seperti misalnya rupa-kalapa memiliki 3 kategori dan punya karakteristik tertentu. Ciri ini yang dimaksud svabhava, dan dalam Madhyamaka, karena fenomena muncul bergantungan, tergantung pula dengan persepsi dan indriah, maka sebetulnya tidak ada suatu ciri sejati yang dikenali dari bahkan fenomena terkecil tersebut, maka disebut hakekatnya "sunya" (kosong).

[xenocross]

Ketika dikatakan "sunyata adalah bentuk", pernyataan ini tidak seharusnya dipahami secara harfiah. Maksudnya adalah, berkat adanya kesunyataan, maka ada bentuk. Pada dasarnya, hanya ada dua cara eksistensi -- apakah benda tersebut sepenuhnya berdiri sendiri dengan inheren (tidak berkaitan dengan yang lainnya) atau dia bergantung kepada benda lain, dengan kata lain dia sunya atau keberadaannya tidak inheren.

Tentu saja penjelasan yang kedua adalah pandangan yang benar. Karena alasan inilah, yaitu misalnya bentuk tidak memiliki keberadaan yang sejati-lah, sehingga dia eksis/ada. Jika dia sepenuhnya berdiri sendiri, maka dia tidak dapat dihasilkan dari sebab dan kondisi. Oleh karena itu, dengan alasan demikianlah, maka bentuk tidak memiliki keberadaan yang sejati karena dia dapat dan memang bergantung pada misalnya, sebab yang menghasilkannya.

Oleh karena itu, karena ketiadaan kebebasan ini maka sesungguhnya dia muncul dengan cara bergantung pada hal lain; yakni bergantung pada fenomena yang lain. Ada sebuah ungkapan yang mengatakan "semua fenomena adalah perwujudan dari kesunyataan." Pernyataan ini juga jangan dimaknai secara harfiah. Apa yang sebenarnya dimaksud disini adalah: dikarenakan mereka sunya akan keberadaan yang inheren (svabhava/ atta) maka mereka bisa muncul, dihasilkan atau dapat eksis

Tak ada benda apapun yang dapat sepenuhnya muncul tanpa bergantung pada sesuatu yang lain. Karena semua fenomena tidak memiliki eksistensi yang mutlak, maka mereka dapat eksis -- mereka eksis dalam cara yang tidak mutlak, berkaitan dengan ketergantungan akan hal lain. Jey Tsongkhapa, dalam ulasannya terhadap Prajnamula, mengatakan bahwa hanya ada dua kemungkinan cara eksistensi --  apakah dia eksis sendiri sepenuhnya atau eksis berkaitan dengan fenomena yang lain. Namun beliau menyatakan bahwa tidak ada satu benda tunggal apapun di dunia ini yang bisa muncul dengan sendirinya. Sesungguhnya, segala sesuatu muncul bergantung kepada fenomena yang lain. Pada dasarnya segala fenomena dikatakan muncul karena dia ditanggapi oleh persepsi. Lagipula, agar sesuatu bisa eksis, dia juga harus bergantung kepada penamaannya. Karena itu, segala sesuatu muncul bergantung kepada persepsi yang menanggapinya dan juga berdasarkan penamaannya.

Ada sebuah cerita yang berhubungan dengan topik ini yang mungkin bisa sedikit membantu. Suatu hari saya diundang untuk memberikan kuliah pada Institut Budaya Dunia India di Bangalore, India Selatan. Kebanyakan orang yang menghadiri kuliah tersebut adalah penganut Hindu yang berasal dari berbagai aliran. Saya sedang membicarakan mengenai ketanpa-akuan dari segala fenomena. Kemudian, saat sesi tanya jawab, seorang lelaki tua berdiri dan mengatakan "Tidaklah mungkin bahwa semua fenomena tanpa diri (aku/atta). Misalnya Ishvara, Sang pencipta dunia, memiliki diri (aku) dan tidak bergantung pada yang lain"

Saya mengatakan, "Bagaimana dengan kenyataan bahwa dia tidak memiliki diri yang sejati karena dia bergantung pada fenomena yang lain seperti persepsi Anda terhadapnya dan nama "Ishvara" yang Anda berikan padanya?" Beliau menggelengkan kepalanya, dan terus memegang pendapatnya. Namun saya lanjut mengatakan,
"Jika dia tidak bergantung kepada persepsi yang Anda padanya dan nama yang Anda berikan padanya, maka bagaimana orang lain pertama sekali mengetahui bahwa dia ada?"
Setelah pernyataan ini, ada beberapa menit semua terdiam dan kemudian dia menganggukkan kepalanya. Saya terkejut dengan kenyataan bahwa dia tiba-tiba mendapatkan pemahaman baru.


Transkrip ceramah Yang Mulia Dagpo Rinpoche tentang topik "Prajna Paramita Hrdaya Sutra", 16-19 November 2007, Kuala Lumpur

[dilbert]

Perbedaan yang bisa dilihat adalah kalau di Theravada fenomena dianalisis dan dipecah menjadi fenomena yang lebih kecil, kemudian dipecah lagi menjadi yang lebih kecil sampai akhirnya ada satu bagian yang tidak lagi terbagi.

saya baru tahu di Theravada ada pembagian-pembagian sampai ke bagian yang tidak terbagi lagi... apakah itu ? #mohon-pencerahannya.

[dilbert]

The Abhidhamma deals with realities existing in the ultimate sense, or paramattha dhamma in Pali. There are four such realities:
1. Citta, mind or consciousness, defined as 'that which knows or experiences' an object. Citta occurs as distinct momentary states of consciousness.
2. Cetasika, the mental factors that arise and occur along with the citta.
3. Rupa, physical phenomenon or material form.
4. Nibbana, the unconditioned state of bliss which is the final goal.
C
itta, the cetasika, and rupa are conditioned realities. They arise because of conditions sustaining them cease to continue to do so. They are impermanent states. Nibbana, on the other hand, is an unconditioned reality. It does not arise and, therefore, does not fall away. These four realities can be experienced regardless of the names we may choose to give them. Other than these realities, everything _ be it within ourselves or without, whether in the past, present or future, whether coarse or subtle, low or lofty, far or near _ is a concept and not an ultimate reality.
Citta, cetisaka(?), and Nibbana are also called nama. Nibbana is an unconditioned nama. The two conditioned nama, that is, cita and cetasika, together with rupa (form), make up psychophysical organisms, including human beings. Both mind and matter, or nama-rupa, are analysed in Abhidhamma as though under a microscope. Events connected with the process of birth and death are explained in detail. The Abhidhamma clarifies intricate points of the Dhamma and enables the arising of an understanding of reality, thereby setting forth in clear terms the Path of Emancipation. The realization we gain from the Abhidhamma with regard to our lives and the world is not in a conventional sense, but absolute reality.

-----

saya gak tahu darimana penafsiran di Abhidhamma ada dikatakan soal pembagian sampai ke bagian terkecil yang tidak dibagi lagi... dan kemudian ditafsirkan sebagai svabhava...

citta, cetasika --> impermanent states.

Nibbana --> unconditional states.

rupa --> conditional states.

yang mana-kah yang dimaksud dalam pembahasan di abhidhamma ada bagian yang terkecil yang tidak terbagi-bagi lagi, yang menjadi realitas sejati (baca : di-terjemahkan sebagai svabhava atau doktrin svabhava) ?

[xenocross]

The first supreme meaning or object to learn is citta. Before we come to citta, we want to emphasize and especially explain the Abhidhamma approach – as opposed to the Suttanta or Vinaya approach – is explaining the Dhammas in the sense of truth, as true object of perception, or true object of mind. Dhammas are that which have sabhava, or salakkhana, a very intriguing and complex word. It is, in a way, the understanding of what is sabhava, the self-nature. It is the root of all interpretation of the sabhava. Understanding sabhava is the root of all the different approaches we have in Buddhism as to the understanding of Dhamma and the way to liberation.

In the Hinayana school, or lesser vehicle school, as it is considered to be by the Mahayana scholars, the vehicle is the Arahant as opposed to the Mahayana where the vehicle is the Buddha. The criticism of the Mahayana – and in a way the whole structure of Mahayana – is based on the criticism of this concept of sabhava. But many Mahayana scholars criticize but have never studied Theravada, and thus, have a very serious misunderstanding of the Theravada Abhidhamma. They consider all the so-called Hinayana schools the same as Vaibhasika. The Mahayana scholars consider the idea of sabhava, the self-nature of entities, the same no matter whether it is from the Theravada or Sarvastivada school. In fact, there are some very important differences in the interpretation of how the sabhava is understood in the Theravada and in the Sarvastivada, or Vaibhasika, traditions. We will not go into detail on that.

What remains important to point out is that the paramatthas are the 4 supreme meanings or objects – Nibbana, citta, cetasika, and rupa. This, of course, is problematic, because there can be only one supreme meaning or object. It is very difficult to have many supremes. The relationship between the supreme of Nibbana and the supremes of citta, cetasika and rupa is not explained. Supreme object or meaning is understood in an ontological and epistemological sense, but what exactly the relation between the 4 different supremes and how we can have 4 different supremes is not mentioned.

What is understood is that when we understand these 4 supreme meanings and the 4 supreme objects, we can attain liberation. Some very important scholars have pointed out that the Abhidhamma approach, in a way, is a pluralistic approach. The Abhidhamma is linked to the Samkya philosophy, which is a similar approach. In Samkya, by understanding 25 tatvas (realities) we understand everything. In Abhidhamma, by understanding the 4 supreme objects or meanings we also understand everything.

We speak of two Nibbanas, one with the 5 aggregates of existence still remaining and one without the 5 aggregates of existence. But, Nibbana is only one. But, as we will see, the one citta (state of consciousness) becomes 89 or 121 cittas. This is the clarity of the Theravada Abhidhamma approach. Detailed analysis of the citta is based on very detailed analysis of the mind processes, of the cittavithis. This division of one citta into many cittas is not problematic, because a citta has only 1 characteristic differentiating the object, vijanati, so all these 81 or 121 cittas, states of consciousness, have only one characteristic of differentiating the object. But, when we come to the cetasikas (mental factors) we have 52 Dhammas, each with a different characteristic. A particularity of Theravada Abhidhamma, as opposed to the Sarvastivada Abhidhamma, is that all these Dhammas are not only discussed from the point of view of their own lakkhana (characeristic), but must also be understood from the view of rasa.

Rasa is a word very difficult to translated into English. This book translates it as function, but it means much more than just function. Literally, rasa means taste. And those who study Indian culture know the different types of music, medicine and experiences are classified into different rasas, different tastes. The function actually means the taste of the object, how one actually experiences it. This part of the analysis is also there in the Sarvastivada and Vaibhasika tradition. Even in the Yogacara tradition they discuss the Dhammas in the sense of lakkhana and rasa, characteristic and function, respectively.

What is particular about the Theravada approach is that this is not considered to be sufficient. There also has to be (proximate cause). Sorry, first I should say paccupatthana (manifestation), or how these Dhammas actually appear, how they establish themselves in our perception. Then, all of these Dhammas are everything that exists in the world, and everything only exists in interdependent origination. So, these salakkhanas, self-characteristics, according to the Theravada tradition, also only arise in interdependent origination, as opposed to the Sarvastivada tradition. The book is very emphatic on that fact. There are Theravadans who would agree salakkhanas are empty of interdependent nature, yet nevertheless, they have a lasting characteristic. Whether today, in the future, or in the past, the characteristic of earth remains hardness.

An intelligent man knows we can only experience hardness when we know softness, and without knowing hardness we cannot know softness. Similarly, heat being the self-characteristic of fire, every intelligent mans knows that we can only know heat when we know coolness. I know this book to be cool because my hand is warm. If I don’t know the hand being warm, I cannot know the coolness of this book. So, obviously, these salakkhanas (self-characteristics), the sabhava (self-natures) of these Dhammas are not meant as something existing independently in the three times, but only as it is understood in the Vaibhasika tradition, and as it is criticized by the Mahayana scholars. The Theravada tradition never committed itself to such an idea. So, as the Vissudhi Magga clearly explains, interdependent origination, their interdependent nature, is emptiness. In the ultimate sense, these Dhammas, even in the Theravada tradition, are considered empty, yet nevertheless have a real characteristic or self-nature, which is lasting.

To the students of Mahayana, the structure of these self-existing Dhammas, or self-existing characteristics, was smashed completely over hundreds of years and many endless disputes about which Dhamma has real characteristic and which does not, which is just a Dhamma of convenience and which really exists. This was a subject matter of endless discussion in the history of Dhamma. Each school of Buddhism had its own version of what was the real existing Dhamma and what was only a Dhamma of convenience.

Nagarjuna criticized and logically demolished the possibility of sabhava, self-existing nature. Logically, in the Buddhist sense, it is not tenable. In Mahayana Buddhism, there appeared disciples of Nagarjuna, like Chandrakirti and the Prasandrikas, who claimed that Dhammas have no nature whatsoever, that the nature of Dhammas is the nature of others, and whatever exists exists in the virtue of existence of others. So, this is the meaning of emptiness.

Some scholars, as you know, liked sabhava for convenience, merely for the sake of argument. Then, from the Yogacara school comes a very different interpretation: outer things have no nature at all, but that which has real nature is the mind and its mental factors. All that we understand in this world is just a manifestation of this mind.

Now, in the Theravada tradition we come to a middle position. The Theravada Abhidhamma is based on the analysis of these sabhava, real or existing or self natures, but these self-natures are definitely existing only in interdependence and cannot arise without the existence of other entities. So, this is an approach which is followed in our analysis, and with this understanding we come to the first supreme object or meaning in the world, citta.

http://www.phathue.com/buddhism/dharma-talks/abhidhamma-with-dhammadipa/

[K.K.]

The first supreme meaning or object to learn is citta. Before we come to citta, we want to emphasize and especially explain the Abhidhamma approach – as opposed to the Suttanta or Vinaya approach – is explaining the Dhammas in the sense of truth, as true object of perception, or true object of mind. Dhammas are that which have sabhava, or salakkhana, a very intriguing and complex word. It is, in a way, the understanding of what is sabhava, the self-nature. It is the root of all interpretation of the sabhava. Understanding sabhava is the root of all the different approaches we have in Buddhism as to the understanding of Dhamma and the way to liberation.

In the Hinayana school, or lesser vehicle school, as it is considered to be by the Mahayana scholars, the vehicle is the Arahant as opposed to the Mahayana where the vehicle is the Buddha. The criticism of the Mahayana – and in a way the whole structure of Mahayana – is based on the criticism of this concept of sabhava. But many Mahayana scholars criticize but have never studied Theravada, and thus, have a very serious misunderstanding of the Theravada Abhidhamma. They consider all the so-called Hinayana schools the same as Vaibhasika. The Mahayana scholars consider the idea of sabhava, the self-nature of entities, the same no matter whether it is from the Theravada or Sarvastivada school. In fact, there are some very important differences in the interpretation of how the sabhava is understood in the Theravada and in the Sarvastivada, or Vaibhasika, traditions. We will not go into detail on that.

What remains important to point out is that the paramatthas are the 4 supreme meanings or objects – Nibbana, citta, cetasika, and rupa. This, of course, is problematic, because there can be only one supreme meaning or object. It is very difficult to have many supremes. The relationship between the supreme of Nibbana and the supremes of citta, cetasika and rupa is not explained. Supreme object or meaning is understood in an ontological and epistemological sense, but what exactly the relation between the 4 different supremes and how we can have 4 different supremes is not mentioned.

What is understood is that when we understand these 4 supreme meanings and the 4 supreme objects, we can attain liberation. Some very important scholars have pointed out that the Abhidhamma approach, in a way, is a pluralistic approach. The Abhidhamma is linked to the Samkya philosophy, which is a similar approach. In Samkya, by understanding 25 tatvas (realities) we understand everything. In Abhidhamma, by understanding the 4 supreme objects or meanings we also understand everything.

We speak of two Nibbanas, one with the 5 aggregates of existence still remaining and one without the 5 aggregates of existence. But, Nibbana is only one. But, as we will see, the one citta (state of consciousness) becomes 89 or 121 cittas. This is the clarity of the Theravada Abhidhamma approach. Detailed analysis of the citta is based on very detailed analysis of the mind processes, of the cittavithis. This division of one citta into many cittas is not problematic, because a citta has only 1 characteristic differentiating the object, vijanati, so all these 81 or 121 cittas, states of consciousness, have only one characteristic of differentiating the object. But, when we come to the cetasikas (mental factors) we have 52 Dhammas, each with a different characteristic. A particularity of Theravada Abhidhamma, as opposed to the Sarvastivada Abhidhamma, is that all these Dhammas are not only discussed from the point of view of their own lakkhana (characeristic), but must also be understood from the view of rasa.

Rasa is a word very difficult to translated into English. This book translates it as function, but it means much more than just function. Literally, rasa means taste. And those who study Indian culture know the different types of music, medicine and experiences are classified into different rasas, different tastes. The function actually means the taste of the object, how one actually experiences it. This part of the analysis is also there in the Sarvastivada and Vaibhasika tradition. Even in the Yogacara tradition they discuss the Dhammas in the sense of lakkhana and rasa, characteristic and function, respectively.

What is particular about the Theravada approach is that this is not considered to be sufficient. There also has to be (proximate cause). Sorry, first I should say paccupatthana (manifestation), or how these Dhammas actually appear, how they establish themselves in our perception. Then, all of these Dhammas are everything that exists in the world, and everything only exists in interdependent origination. So, these salakkhanas, self-characteristics, according to the Theravada tradition, also only arise in interdependent origination, as opposed to the Sarvastivada tradition. The book is very emphatic on that fact. There are Theravadans who would agree salakkhanas are empty of interdependent nature, yet nevertheless, they have a lasting characteristic. Whether today, in the future, or in the past, the characteristic of earth remains hardness.

An intelligent man knows we can only experience hardness when we know softness, and without knowing hardness we cannot know softness. Similarly, heat being the self-characteristic of fire, every intelligent mans knows that we can only know heat when we know coolness. I know this book to be cool because my hand is warm. If I don’t know the hand being warm, I cannot know the coolness of this book. So, obviously, these salakkhanas (self-characteristics), the sabhava (self-natures) of these Dhammas are not meant as something existing independently in the three times, but only as it is understood in the Vaibhasika tradition, and as it is criticized by the Mahayana scholars. The Theravada tradition never committed itself to such an idea. So, as the Vissudhi Magga clearly explains, interdependent origination, their interdependent nature, is emptiness. In the ultimate sense, these Dhammas, even in the Theravada tradition, are considered empty, yet nevertheless have a real characteristic or self-nature, which is lasting.

To the students of Mahayana, the structure of these self-existing Dhammas, or self-existing characteristics, was smashed completely over hundreds of years and many endless disputes about which Dhamma has real characteristic and which does not, which is just a Dhamma of convenience and which really exists. This was a subject matter of endless discussion in the history of Dhamma. Each school of Buddhism had its own version of what was the real existing Dhamma and what was only a Dhamma of convenience.

Nagarjuna criticized and logically demolished the possibility of sabhava, self-existing nature. Logically, in the Buddhist sense, it is not tenable. In Mahayana Buddhism, there appeared disciples of Nagarjuna, like Chandrakirti and the Prasandrikas, who claimed that Dhammas have no nature whatsoever, that the nature of Dhammas is the nature of others, and whatever exists exists in the virtue of existence of others. So, this is the meaning of emptiness.

Some scholars, as you know, liked sabhava for convenience, merely for the sake of argument. Then, from the Yogacara school comes a very different interpretation: outer things have no nature at all, but that which has real nature is the mind and its mental factors. All that we understand in this world is just a manifestation of this mind.

Now, in the Theravada tradition we come to a middle position. The Theravada Abhidhamma is based on the analysis of these sabhava, real or existing or self natures, but these self-natures are definitely existing only in interdependence and cannot arise without the existence of other entities. So, this is an approach which is followed in our analysis, and with this understanding we come to the first supreme object or meaning in the world, citta.

http://www.phathue.com/buddhism/dharma-talks/abhidhamma-with-dhammadipa/

Aneh, di sini kok seolah-olah Vaibhasika/Sarvastivada tidak menganut interdependensi yah? Dan jika Theravada memang menganut interdependensi seperti yang dikemukakan Nagarjuna, mengapa masih mempertahankan ide sabhava itu sendiri? (Walaupun memang tidak menutup kemungkinan adanya perbedaan pendapat dalam sekte Theravada sendiri seperti halnya Hadayavatthu.)

[djoe]

This demonstrates that the exalted beings achieve liberation from cyclic existence by understanding nonerroneously the reality of existence and nonexistence. Since neither of these can exist without depending on the other,
their reality is to not have an essence established through their own nature.

Some argue that since the Buddha has said that samsara—an entity—and nirvana—a nonentity—exist, it makes no sense that they lack essence. In response to that the Buddha has said that they exist in accordance with the mode of perception of an ordinary person’s conventional consciousness, but not in accordance with an exalted being’s mode of perception of reality. The attainment of nirvana is said to be the realization of cessation—at the state of fruition— through the wisdom by means of which one understands completely that cyclic existence is not essentially arisen.

On the contrary, if the attainment of nirvana were posited as the extinction of afflictions that exist through their own characteristics and the non-arising of further aggregates this would be refuted on the grounds that in that case none of these—neither the realization of cessation, viz. nirvana, nor the extinction of afflictive emotions and aggregates—would be possible. This is the meaning of authoritative sources expounding the nirvana of the lesser vehicle as well. The rest of this treatise is written in support of this proposition. In short, if the realization and attainment of nirvana at the stage of achieving arhathood do not imply the realization of the way things really are, that is, ultimate truth, then the attainment of nirvana would absolutely not be possible.

This is the principal reason that this fact is proved primarily through citations of the su¯tras of the lesser vehicle.