Filosofi Middle Way Nagarjuna

[xenocross]

Ini saya tulis sebagai catatan biar ga lupa dan ga bingung.
Kemarin bahannya didapat dari Public Teaching, terus diresearch lagi... makin pusing. Kalau ada yg bisa menjelaskan lagi, saya sangat berterima kasih

[xenocross]

> Sesuatu yang berdiri sendiri (tanpa sebab) tak dapat dihasilkan
> Dan hasil yang diakibatkan sesuatu yang tidak ada adalah seperti bunga
> (yang tumbuh)di angkasa
> Karena terdapat kesalahan pada kedua hal ini
> Maka tidak mungkin ada hasil dari keduanya
>
> Fenomena tidak dihasilkan dari dirinya sendiri
> Maupun dari fenomena lain (yang berdiri sendiri), ataupun oleh keduanya,
> ataupun tanpa penyebab
> Oleh karena itu mereka tidak mempunyai keberadaan yang sejati.

Disini diberikan 4 pandangan yang berbeda dari ajaran Buddha tentang asal-usul fenomena. Ada 4 pandangan yang dimiliki oleh aliran lain (termasuk zaman sekarang)
1. Fenomena mempunyai keberadaan yang inheren (berdiri sendiri)
2. Fenomena dihasilkan oleh fenomena lain yg mempunyai keberadaan inheren.
3. Fenomena dihasilkan oleh gabungan 2 fenomena di atas
4. Fenomena dihasilkan tanpa sebab.

Kita bahas kenapa secara logika 4 pandangan ini salah

1. Self-Sufficient, inherent,self- causation phenomena

Mari kita panggil fenomena pertama ini namanya si A.
A berdiri sendiri. A menyebabkan dirinya sendiri. A adalah sebab sekaligus akibat.
A tiba-tiba muncul begitu saja tanpa sebab lain, kecuali dirinya sendiri.
A --->A     A (sebab) menghasilkan A (akibat)
Kalau ini terjadi, berarti A sebab dan A akibat muncul pada waktu yang sama.
Muncul pertanyaan, kalau A akibat sudah ada, kenapa harus dihasilkan lagi?
Kalau A sebab menghasilkan A akibat, padahal pada saat yg sama sudah ada A akibat, akan ada dua A akibat yang identik!
Karena A adalah sebab sekaligus akibat, A akan terus menerus menciptakan diri sendiri
 A sebab ------> A akibat = A sebab ----------> A akibat ---> A akibat .......
Pusing kan? Gak mungkin kan?

The first, self- causation, is exemplified by the Vedic tradition of asserting the reality of the immutable Universal Soul, atman. Briefly, this declares all effects to be inherent in their cause, which cause is in every case some form of the eternal atman.

FOOTNOTE: cf. David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1975), 6-15 A problem with self- causation is that the effect must be inherent in the cause. If so, then nothing new has occurred or come to be.

"The Madhyamaka says that, if in fact cause and effect are identical, then having bought cottonseed with the price one would pay for cloth, one ought to be able to clothe oneself with it. The idea that cause and effect are identical thus leads to absurdity. If cause and effect are identical, then there would be no difference between father and son, and also no difference between food and excrement."
Peter D Santina, CHAPTER EIGHTEEN The Philosophy of the Middle Way.

Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness:
Moreover, a cause is not justified in the three times. It may be asked how? First, if it is supposed that the cause is prior (to the effect), of what is it the cause? Yet, if it is supposed that (the cause is) subsequent (to the effect), then what need is there for the cause, as the effect is already complete? Yet (again) if it is supposed that the cause and effect are simultaneous, then among the cause and the effect which originate simultaneously, which is the cause of which and which is the effect of which? Thus, in all the three times, a cause is not justified.


2. Fenomena disebabkan oleh fenomena external lain yg berdiri sendiri

Mari kita panggil fenomena kedua ini namanya si B.
B muncul sebagai hasil dari A (yg sudah ada di atas)
Nah lho! Bukannya sudah jelas si A --> A?  Kenapa bisa A ----> B?
A adalah fenomena yg berdiri sendiri, ada tanpa melalui proses, berarti dia statis dan tidak berproses. Sifat A adalah permanen. Kalau dia mau menghasilkan yg lain, dia harus berubah. Tapi A tidak mampu berubah. Jadi tidak mungkin B dapat dihasilkan.
Dan lagi, A sudah dijelaskan tidak ada, jadi B tidak mungkin ada

Alasan lain adalah bahwa A dan B mempunyai sifat yg berbeda. Apa bisa tikus menghasilkan gajah?

Atau karena A, tanpa pengaruh fenomena lain, dapat menghasilkan B, maka dikatakan B secara intrinsik ada dalam A/ sifat B ada dalam A.
Hal ini sama saja mengatakan bahwa biji pohon sebesar pohon, atau biji pohon seberat pohon yg sudah besar.
Biji pohon menjadi pohon tergantung oleh sebab2 lain.

Other- or external- causation declares all change to be produced by some form of a deus ex machina, such as God, fate, or a deterministic self- nature.

FOOTNOTE: ibid., 5 A problem with other-causation is that if cause and effect are different then the relation is lost, and, for example, fire could be produced from water.

"In the case of the second alternative--that cause and effect are different--anything could originate from anything else, because all phenomena are equally different. Hence a stalk of rice might just as easily originate from a piece of coal as from a grain of rice, for there would be no connection between a stalk of rice and a grain of rice, and a piece of coal and a grain of rice would have the same relationship of difference to a stalk of rice. Thus the notion that cause and effect are absolutely different is an intrinsically absurd idea."
Peter D Santina


3. Fenomena dihasilkan oleh gabungan 2 fenomena di atas

Kita panggil dia si C.      A + B -----> C

Kan A dan B tidak ada? Berarti C tidak ada !

A third type of causal theory advocated by some schools is basically a combination of the self- and other-causation. The problem with this is that both of the above two problems are compounded.

"The third alternative--that cause and effect are both identical and different--is no more acceptable, and suffers from two faults. First, both the argument that refuted the identity of cause and effect and the argument that refuted the difference of cause and effect are applicable to the third alternative as well. The argument refuting the identity of cause and effect is applicable insofar as cause and effect are identical, and the argument refuting their difference is applicable insofar as cause and effect are different. We really have no new proposition in the case of the third alternative. Second, the third alternative is faulty because of the law of contradiction: no phenomenon can have contradictory characteristics. An entity cannot be both existent and nonexistent at once, just as one entity cannot be both red and not red at the same time."
Peter D Santina

4. Fenomena ada tanpa sebab.

__________  -----> D

Dari ga ada apa apa tiba tiba ada....

The final option is that neither self- nor other-causation operates, which position is in effect an indeterminism that denies all causation. If anything were to emerge ever, anywhere, then everything could emerge at all times, everywhere.

Finally, the fourth alternative--the idea that phenomena originate without cause--is rejected by appeal to common experience. For instance, if we set a kettle of water on a lighted stove, the water will boil, but if we set it on a block of ice, it won't. Hence Madhyamaka philosophy concludes that causality according to any one of these four alternatives--from self, from other, from both, and without cause--is impossible. This is the Madhyamaka critique of causality.
Peter D Santina


the Buddha taught that there is no substantial essence underlying and supporting the manifest world.

FOOTNOTE: The reader's attention is called to the etymology of the word "substantial:" the Latin roots are sub = "under" + stare = "to stand." A "substance" is that which stands under something and provides the ground of being for it. The abiding soul and/or an absolute God posited by some schools of thought is, by definition, not dependent upon any element of the world for its existence, and the Buddha's philosophy holds that anything that is not dependent cannot be real. It would either transcend or precede existence, and thus could not exist. Notwithstanding, the mass of humanity perceives and believes in the real existence of the world, all the elements contained therein, and the characteristics of and relations between these elements. Nagarjuna devotes the majority of his sections to an analysis of these aspects of the putative world, such as cause-and-effect, the senses, action, and time. Following this, he examines the Buddha's teachings themselves, focusing on the nature of the enlightened being, the Noble Path, enlightenment itself, and dependent arising.


Referensi:
Nagarjuna's MulaMadhyamaKarika (Foundation Stanzas of Middle Way)
Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness
Atisha's Bodhipathapradipam (Lamp of the Path to Enlightenment)
Pabhongka Rinpoche's "Liberation in Your Hands" Part 3

casuality and emptiness: The Wisdom of Nagarjuna
Dr Peter Della Santina. Ebook Buddhanet

BUDDHISM IN FORTY-EIGHT CHAPTERS : An Introduction to the Major Traditions of Buddhism. Dr Peter Della Santina
http://www.angelfire.com/electronic/bodhidharma/buddhism.html
Thinking in Buddhism:Nagarjuna's Middle Way
http://bahai-library.com/personal/jw/other.pubs/nagarjuna/nag05.html#RTFToC15

Public Teaching Dagpo Rinpoche yg saya ikuti dan diskusi-diskusi yg dilakukan bersama teman-teman sedharma.

Semoga bermanfaat menambah kebijaksanaan.

[xenocross]

dapet text komentar === makin pusing.....

dari: Introduction to the Middle Way
Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara
With commentary by Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche


(a) Autogenesis (Self-Arising)
Here our symbolic opponents are the Samkhya school, which was founded by Kapila, who is thought to have lived in the 7th century BC. It advocates a quite complicated dualistic vision of the universe, starting with the old question, what is the universe made of. It leads on to questions about the true self or, more accurately, telling the true self from that which appears to be self.
According to the Samkhyas, there are two basic categories in the universe: purusha and prakriti.
They say that the history of the world is the history of these two fundamental constituents, which is quite different from Upanishad thought. From this simple dualism develops a very complex set of interrelations between purusha, which is like the spirit of atman, and prakriti, which is like the matter of original nature. The nature of purusha is spirit; it is many spirits. It is being, consciousness. It is limitless, untainted awareness.

The Samkhyas argue that the world is formed as purusha infuses prakriti, and thereby stimulates the three states of prakriti, which are called the three gunas. These are activity (rajas in Sanskrit), inactivity (tamas) and transparency (sattva). This is a very interesting theory – it is the highest Hindu philosophy. If you are not careful when explaining the Buddha nature, you might end up talking about something more like purusha.
The gunas interact and play different parts in the development of prakriti. As prakriti is
activated, it becomes buddhi, or intellect, out of which individual egos evolve. Individuals often confuse their ego with their true self, and liberation can only happen when the true distinction is understood. The true liberation is obtained at death, when the bonds between purusha and prakriti are dissolved.
The Samkhya school also believes strongly in causation. This part is important. They argue for cause, effect and the indestructibility of matter. Scientists say something quite like this. It is known as the theory of existent effect, which means that the effect already exists in the cause of all things. So, in some mysterious way, the cause of something pre-exists its effect, although they are distinct. Consider a jar of clay, for example. The jar is the clay, but it is not the lump of clay.
The basic idea is that what already exists cannot change, and what is not existent cannot be born.
This is a very good idea! What is there cannot be changed into something else, what is not there cannot be born. In a way, it is a dualistic view, and they accept that. They are saying that in that clay, the vase is already there. It is not as though it was clay before and then becomes, or changes into, a vase. They are saying that the pot is in the clay: the effect exists at the same time as the cause. I am sure that if I prepare for a few days and then take the side of the Samkhyas, most of you will end up fumbling with words as you try to attack me. The Samkhyas are a great school, not just a stupid bunch of people!

[xenocross]

[Q]: What happens if the pot breaks?
[A]: Which pot? If you are making another pot with the broken clay, then the other pot already
exists there. Cause and effect exist at the same time. It is known as the theory of the
existent effect. Water has the effect of quenching our thirst. This effect is there, which is
why we drink water. If it did not have the effect of quenching thirst, then no matter how
much water we might drink, it would never quench our thirst. This logic is incredible!
[Q]: Is there a substance that is underneath all this?
[A]: Yes – prakriti, in its three states of rajas, tamas and sattva.
[Q]: But this makes no sense.
[A]: That is good! Because that is exactly what Chandrakirti is saying. You do not need to know
everything about the Samkhya school here; all you need to know is that one of their
essential theories is that the cause already contains the result. Their logic is that what is
existent cannot be changed, and what is not existent cannot be born. So, within the clay,
there must be a pot. If the pot does not already exist there, then it cannot be born. So, no
matter how a potter might try to make a pot, he could never create one.
[Q]: If the effect already exists in the cause, we cannot speak of the theory of causality.
[A]: I am not defending them! We will come to all this shortly.

(i) Reasoning from the commentary (Madhyamakavatara)
[H16] (a) Autogenesis refuted by suchness
[H17] (i) Untenable consequences explicit in the opponent’s statement

I do not know how you are finding things like these syllogisms. You might think that we are
learning new things here, but we are not. We are learning something that we have always done,

but in order to study a philosophy, we have to learn about our normal habits using words and
categories. This is why you might find it difficult.
Even when a cook boils an egg, there is a complete syllogism and a complete inferential logic. If
you have this much water, this much heat and this much fire in the stove, the egg will be cooked
around this time. So now you might ask, why do we need to study this? We need to study this
because we are trying to prove something that cannot be directly cognised, like the fire on the
hill. That is not an object of direct cognition. But if you can see the smoke, then you can say
that there must be fire. This is the syllogism, the inferential logic, and we have drawn
conclusions this way for many centuries. It is similar in this case, when we talk about the
refutation of ‘born from the self’, or autogenesis. However, the root text is very condensed, and
you may find it hard to follow, so I will explain it briefly and then we should have a discussion.

(a) Such genesis would be meaningless (Buddhapalita’s refutation),
6:8.3-4
There is no purpose in something already arisen arising again.
What is already arisen cannot arise again.

Chandrakirti starts to negate self-birth in the third line of the 8th sloka. The third and fourth lines
of the 8th sloka are Buddhapalita’s refutation. He argues that if things are born from the self, then
there is no purpose or benefit to the act of birth. The act of birth is not even necessary if things
are born from the self, because they are already there. As we have seen, the Svatantrikas say that
mental formations are not born from the self because they are existent. You can only have the
idea of birth for something that does not already exist. There was no flower in your garden
before, but now it is being born

Do not think that this is complicated. It is very simple. If something is already there, then it
cannot be produced, because it is already there. If something is born from the self, then there
must already be a self there that is giving birth. And if the self is already there, then what is the
point of being born? The whole purpose of so-called taking birth is that you do not have a child,
so you produce a child. But here, the child is already there. If somebody walks into the tent and
says she has come from the kitchen – that is our ordinary conception. But in this kind of
analysis, she was already here. That coming from the kitchen does not exist. These are hidden
simple aspects of life. They are very simple, but they usually remain hidden in our lives. The
important thing to remember is that the Samkhyas say the result is already there.

The Samkhyas are saying that cause and effect have one essence, and that the cause contains the
result. In the ninth chapter of the Bodhicharyavatara, Shantideva negates this argument, saying
that in this case, when you eat rice, you must be eating shit (9:135.3-4). You might argue that
there is a potential of shit there, and that this is what you are eating. But because the Samkhyas
believe in things being truly existent, they cannot use the word ‘potential’. They believe that
purusha is truly existent, that prakriti is the wealth of the purusha, and that purusha enjoys the
prakriti. Purusha, the atman, is truly and permanent existent, so they cannot even dream of
talking about potential. Words like ‘potential’ belong to the dependent arising school, people
like us.

[xenocross]

(b) No genesis would ever actually occur (Chandrakirti’s refutation),
6:9.1-2
If you truly believe something already created could recreate,
Production such as germination could not occur in ordinary experience.

The first two lines of the 9th sloka are a new negation by Chandrakirti. The Samkhyas say that
cause and effect have one essence, so they are saying that the seed comes from the seed, because
they are one essence. This is another Prasangika method of attack. Since the Samkhyas believe
things have the same essence, they are saying that seed is producing seed. In this case, there will
never be a time with a shoot. The occurrence of shoot can never exist at all, because the time is
totally occupied by the seed.


(ii) Conflicting consequences implicit in the opponent’s statement
[H18] (a) Such genesis would be endless,
6:9.3-4
Or a seed would continue to recreate until the end of existence –
What [sprout] would ever cause it to cease?

The third line is very similar to the first two lines, but concentrating more on the seed. Here the
Samkhyas will have the consequence that the seed will continue forever, so the shoot will not
have a chance to arise. The fourth line is almost like an answer to a question, which is hidden
here. The question, or objection, from the Samkhyas is that when a seed produces a shoot, the
condition of the seed gradually changes because of things like water, earth, moisture and warmth
and so the seed gradually becomes a shoot. Chandrakirti’s answers: how can it destroy itself,
because according to the Samkhyas, the causes and conditions are not separate from the shoot. If
they are separate, their theory is that phenomena are other-born, not self-born

(b) The nature of cause and effect would be mixed up,
6:10.1-2
A sprout different from its instigating seed – with a distinct form,
Colour, flavour, potency and ripening – could then not exist.

The first and second lines of the 10th sloka say that for the Samkhyas who believe in the selfborn,
a consequence will be that the cause and the result will become mixed up. In other words,
he is saying you could never differentiate between the seed and the shoot, in terms of their
colour, flavour, potency or ripening, because they are the same.

(c) Cause and effect would be both different and the same,
6:10.3-4
If the self-substance of the previous vanishes,
As it assumes another nature, what remains of its suchness?

The two next lines are saying something like this. When you make yoghurt, you start with milk.
But when the milk becomes yoghurt, you cannot say that the yoghurt is a different entity from
the milk. You will not find a shoot that is a totally different entity from a seed. Another example
is enlightenment. When you attain enlightenment, we Vajrayana people say things like this
person gets enlightenment, this Buddha nature becomes awakened. The result is already there;
all you need to do is realise this. But because you do not realise this, you create a separation
between cause and effect. And that is delusion, which in turn creates all this illusion.
Chandrakirti’s negation here is in the form of a question. He asks them: if the previous selfsubstance,
such as the seed or milk, vanishes into another nature like yoghurt, then what remains
of its reality or suchness? He is asking them, what remains of the thing that they call self-born?
If something is self-born, then that same suchness must remain, but they have said that it is
already transformed.

[xenocross]

6:11 If in ordinary experience seed is not different from sprout,
You could have perception of neither seed nor sprout.
And, if they were the same, when seeing the sprout,
You should also see the seed. Thus, your thesis is unacceptable.

If the seed is not different from the shoot, then the consequence for the Samkhyas is that in the
same way that they cannot perceive the seed, they also will not see the shoot. Or because they
are the same, then when they see the shoot, they should also see the seed. Now he negates selfborn
even in the relative, conventional truth.

[xenocross]

(b) Autogenesis refuted by ordinary conventional experience,
6:12.1-2
Because a result is seen upon disappearance of the cause,
To say they are the same is not accepted even in ordinary experience.

Even in the ordinary experiences, although the cause such as milk exhausts, we can still see the
result like yoghurt. That’s why even in ordinary experience, ordinary people would not say that
cause and effect are one, because ordinary people would say that it was milk before and it has
now become yoghurt. They would say that they are separate. This is why a thesis that believes
in things being born from the self, such an imputation, cannot be accepted not only in the
ultimate truth, but even in the conventional truth.

[H16] (c) Concluding summary of these two,
6:12.3-4
So-called creation from a self, when properly investigated
Is impossible, in suchness as well as ordinary experience.

[H15] (ii) Reasoning from the commentary (Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarikas),

6:13
If creation arises from a self, it follows that the created, the creator,
The act and the agent all are the same.
As these are not one, this ascertation is impossible,
As there will follow the shortcomings already extensively explained.

In conclusion, if one asserts that things are born from the self, then the one that is created, such
as smoke or shoot, will become the same as the creator, like the fire or the seed. In addition, an
act such as writing, and the agent, the writer, will also become the same. That is not possible,
because there are so many shortcomings that we have already explained.

[xenocross]

[Q]: Can you summarise the problem with the Samkhyas?
[A]: What Chandrakirti is unhappy about is that they are trying to establish a truly existent
phenomenon here, purusha, and a prakriti which is like self-born. So, because you say they
are truly existent phenomena, he refutes them with several different arguments. For
example, they say that things are born from the self. Birth means that you produce
something that you do not already have. Otherwise, what is the point of producing? What
is produced? And if you do not have it already, how can it be born from something you do
not have? If you separate these two words – born and self – there is a contradiction. It is
not only a contradiction; it is meaningless. And it is not only meaningless; it is useless,
because it is already there. But there is a big danger here, because we are trying to make it
sound very simple to attack the Samkhyas, and I do not want to do this. They are very
tough people. Actually, all we need to do is delete the word truly existing, and what they
say makes a lot of sense. For example, they are saying that the conch has a sound. And this
is true. But where they went wrong is that they said it is truly existent. If you were to ask
Chandrakirti “Where does the nice sound of the conch come from?”, then conventionally
speaking, he would say it is dependent arising. Mouth depends on the conch, conch
depends on mouth and sound depends on conch and mouth: dependent arising. But the
Samkhyas want to create a god, purusha, which is a truly existent creator. That is where
they went wrong.
[Q]: If we use ordinary conventional experience to refute the Samkhya argument, then why don’t
we accept other-arising as true, since this is accepted by ordinary conventional experience?
[A]: You will see when come to discuss the other-born. Today, our hero said that self-born is not
accepted by ordinary people. But tomorrow, when we talk about other-born, he will say that
ordinary people would say “I planted this tree”, “I planted this son in my wife’s womb”:
they do not accept the other-born. He will slip to the other side again! Ordinary people are
like Madhyamika people: they are flexible, and they do not analyse. The only difference is
that ordinary people just accept a certain reality, but the Madhyamikas analyse and find out
that things are dependent arising. Ordinary people do not have a path, but the Madhyamikas
have a path.
[Q]: I think we are misrepresenting the Samkhya position. We are analysing things that they say
do not truly exist as if they truly exist. It seems to me that they are saying that Atman truly
exists. When they say that all these phenomena are born from self, it is just a linguistic
convention of theirs. What they mean is exactly what you mean. Things cannot actually be
born from the self; they are an illusion. It seems as if they are born from the self, and it
seems as if they have a separate nature, but in fact, they do not. They are all the Atman. So,
we have separated their argument, and we are agreeing with them while also trying to show
that they are absurd.
[A]: The only trouble here is the truly existing. They believe in truly existent Atman, whereas
we do not believe in truly existent emptiness or dependent arising.
[Q]: But they say that atman is limitless. It has no beginning, so it was not born.
[A]: But that is self-contradictory. They cannot both say that atman truly exists and that it is
limitless.
[Q]: Can you explain how they understand time?
[A]: They say that time is illusion; it is maya. They are only slightly different from buddhism, I
think. In the Vajrayana, the Samkhyas are so highly praised that their view actually
qualifies as a defilement that needs to be purified by the first initiation, the vase initiation.
They are very high.
[Q]: Do the bodhisattvas have the view that we are trying to establish here?
[A]: A bodhisattva on the sixth bhumi does not have the three fetters, and because of that, he
does not have the clinging to the view of the Samkhya school. But nor does he have
clinging to the view of the Madhyamika school, because he does not have clinging to any
view. But right now, we are establishing a view for ordinary people like us. We are
gradually beginning to establish a view by negating the four corners of birth from self,

[xenocross]

other, both, and neither. Today we are starting by negating the first corner, which is selfborn.
[Q]: But what about when we talk about the bodhisattva seeing the gift, the giver and the
recipient all as empty?
[A]: That is totally different. The key here is truly existent. Bodhisattvas do not believe in truly
existent emptiness. So, a bodhisattva understands the unity of these three by understanding
that the three do not truly exist. This is why they cannot become one. For the Samkhyas,
although they are also trying to say that they are all one, the difficulty is that they say they
are based on truly existent purusha and prakriti. This is the problem.
I think that the theory of self-born is actually quite difficult to communicate. Most of the time, if
we are students of a philosophy, science, technology or whatever, we are usually more oriented
towards the other-born. The self-born theory is almost something religious. I do not think that
scientists talk about self-born, do they? Scientists do not have this problem of truly existent, do
they? Of course, they still cling to truly existent emotions, but they do not try say that these are
theoretically established.
Let me give a simple example. I am. I have a clinging to a truly existent self. I am true. I am
not like a rainbow; I feel pain when something hits me, I have emotions. Then I start a school,
and after much analysis, I found that I am truly existent. That is a theory. It is the worst kind,
because you already have your own share of problems, but now you are creating a new problem
for yourself.
Chandrakirti has compassion towards the kind of ignorance like feeling ‘I am truly existent’. He
has very gentle compassion, and he gives us a path for this – compassion, bodhicitta and so on.
But if I have created an idea or ideology of ‘I’, he has a very wrathful compassion. He does not
teach me compassion or give me any meditation instructions. First, he will use my own logic
and defeat me. He will show that my establishment of this self is wrong. Ordinary people do not
share the ideas of the Samkhyas. Do you think that you are purusha? No, you think you are
John, or whatever. Scientists fall into this second category.
[Q]: But modern science is showing that the mind depends on the brain.
[A]: If you say that brain is mind, I will accept that. Buddha also said it. Brain is part of the
kamsum (khams gsum), the three realms. Buddha said everything is mind, so brain has to be
mind! But mind is not brain; there is a difference. There is a problem if you think that
mind is brain. Let us suppose that the brain presently sitting in your head, and all its brain
cells, are all in good condition. And then I show you six objects in front of your head.
There is no sickness and no dysfunction, and there are six objects, so the brain has to
perceive all six objects simultaneously. But the brain chooses not to see all of them, and
that choice comes from habitual patterns. This demonstrates that mind is not brain (see
discussion starting on p.240).
[Q]: The brain is a systemic organ. Science has shown that habitual patterns are created while
young people are growing up, so what you are saying is not necessarily true.
[A]: All right. We will come to this during other-production anyway. Debating with scientists is
so difficult, because they do not have an established view! They are always changing their
view, every century, every year, even every time they have a conference! When the Buddha
taught the reality of the phenomena, he said that even before the Buddha came to this earth,
it was like this. And even after all the buddhas have gone, it will still be like this. Even if
buddhas are teaching something completely wrong, reality will never change. We do not
need conferences; we do not need discussions. It is there, it has been like this, it is going to
be like this and it is like this right now.
[Q]: But who is there to say this?
[A]: Nobody has to be there to say this. That reality is simply dependent arising.

[djoe]

 [at] xenocross

ada pdf nya gak??? Introduction to the Middle Way Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara

[xenocross]

bisa donlod
siddharthasintent.org/community/pdf/MadhyamakavataraDJKR.pdf‎

[djoe]

bisa donlod
siddharthasintent.org/community/pdf/MadhyamakavataraDJKR.pdf‎

Bro ada gak pdf Mulamadhyamaka-Karika dari Chandrakirti (Prasannapada)

Saya mencari Mulamadhyamaka lain sebagai pembanding

[xenocross]

Candrakirti 1979 - Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way ; Essential Prasannapada Tr Mervyn Sprung

Long out of print, not yet superseded, Sprung's careful and erudite translation, a culmination of his career, focuses on philosophical clarity. Translated from the Sanskrit (not the Tibetan translation), this is an essential work on Buddhist insight, different from the more common Candrakirti 'Entering the Path' of Tibetan path literature and commentary.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/95463567/Candrakirti-1979-Lucid-Exposition-of-the-Middle-Way-Essential-Prasannapada-Tr-Mervyn-Sprung

[djoe]

Candrakirti 1979 - Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way ; Essential Prasannapada Tr Mervyn Sprung

Long out of print, not yet superseded, Sprung's careful and erudite translation, a culmination of his career, focuses on philosophical clarity. Translated from the Sanskrit (not the Tibetan translation), this is an essential work on Buddhist insight, different from the more common Candrakirti 'Entering the Path' of Tibetan path literature and commentary.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/95463567/Candrakirti-1979-Lucid-Exposition-of-the-Middle-Way-Essential-Prasannapada-Tr-Mervyn-Sprung

mau cari yang free ada gak?

Kalau yang ini ada yg punya free pdfnya gak?
Aryadeva's Four Hundred Stanzas On The Middle Way: With Commentary By Gyel-Tsap (Textual Studies and Translations in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism)

[xenocross]

gak punya. Kalau mau download scribbd titip aja ke aku link nya, ntar aku usahakan dapetin.

nih yg candrakirti aku masukin mediaapi
http://www.mediafire.com/view/nf2fr7xbm4bq26r/95463567-Candrakirti-1979-Lucid-Exposition-of-the-Middle-Way-Essential-Prasannapada-Tr-Mervyn-Sprung.pdf