Kelahiran Kembali dan Antarabhava/Bardo

[xenocross]

Bisa kedua-duanya, perbedaan persepsi dan definisi jika melihat definisi mati di Mahayana seperti yang anda sampaikan. Jika definisi mati seperti yang anda sampaikan bukankah akan memberikan indikasi adanya batin dan fisik yang kekal, mereka hanya berpisah selamanya?

tidak, karena mahayana juga menganut anatta
yg saya tangkap, batin ketika berpisah dengan jasmani, juga mengalami proses peleburan.

ok, jadi sementara ini kesimpulan saya, theravada menganggap proses antarabhava hanyalah bagian dari proses kematian.
Sementara mahayana menganggap antarabhava sebagai proses yg terpisah dari proses kematian

[adi lim]

tidak, karena mahayana juga menganut anatta
yg saya tangkap, batin ketika berpisah dengan jasmani, juga mengalami proses peleburan.

ok, jadi sementara ini kesimpulan saya, theravada menganggap proses antarabhava hanyalah bagian dari proses kematian.
Sementara mahayana menganggap antarabhava sebagai proses yg terpisah dari proses kematian

ntah siapa yang benar ? 

[xenocross]

buat nambah bacaan

https://www.academia.edu/6315793/R%C5%ABpa_and_the_Antar%C4%81bhava

http://books.google.co.id/books?id=BNIdOsp3KIgC&pg=PA251&lpg=PA251&dq=intermediate+state+buddhism&source=bl&ots=MDKIhqLA4G&sig=N7noSnkYKNcqIYoSUuYDpksn11k&hl=en&sa=X&ei=UQ1PVIzAM4PLmAXS1YDYAw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=intermediate%20state%20buddhism&f=false

[bajera]

Terlepas dari semua itu.
Pendekatan model air
Yang paling mendekati
U menjelaskan hal ini
Air di teko akan menjadi airteko
Air di galon menjadi air galon

Sifatnya yg tidak kekal
Yang membuat samsara
Menjadi menakutkan.
Menjadi dukka.

[xenocross]

THE QUESTION OF AN INTERMEDIARY
EXISTENCE (ANTARA-BHAVA)

(6.17) It has been argued above that early Buddhism accepted a
kind of spirit-like life-principle whose primary process is discernment.
This life-principle is not identical with the mortal body, nor
wholly different from it; though it is 'supported' by and 'bound' to
it, it leaves it at death. It has also been seen that discernment is the
'seed' of rebirth, with its nature conducing to specific kinds of rebirth.
It links lives and goes through the phases of 'becoming'. It is thus
appropriate to ask about the 'early Sutta' view of what happens when
the mortal body ends: is death immediately followed by conception
at the start of a new life, ~r is there a time interval between rebirths?
Does 'becoming' occur in a time after death but before conception?
On this question of an 'intennediary existence' (antarii-bhava), the
early schools of Buddhism were more or less equally divided. It was
accepted by the Sarvastivadins, Sammitiyas (a Personalist subschool),
Piirva8ailas, the later MahiSasak:as, and Dir$tantikas, but
denied by the Mahismghikas, early Mahisisak:as, Dhannaguptakas,
Vibhajyavidins and (practically identical) Theravadins (Bareau,
1955: 291).

(6.18) The Theravida position, argued for at Kvu.361-66, is not
the only possible conclusion that can be drawn from the rest of the
Theravidin Abhidhamma. Patthiina I. 312-13 (CR.338-39) asserts
that arising-citta immediately follows falling-away-citta, but this may
mean no more than that in the last phase of 'becoming', 'falling away
and arising', there is an immediate transition from becoming to
'arising' in a new rebirth.8 0.11.63-4 talks of the conditions under
which one might 'grow old, or die, or fall away, or arise', so 'falling
away' is not the same thing, as such, as death.
(6.19) There are, indeed, a number of positive indications that a
between-lives state was included in the world-view of the 'early
Suttas'. An important passage is found at S.IV.399-400, where the
Buddha says:

At a time when a flame, Vaccha, flung by the wind, goes a
very long way, I declare that flame to be fuelled by the wind
(vato). At the time, Vaccha, wind is the fuel (upiidii1Ulf!1)9 • ••
At the time, Vaccha., when a being lays aside this body and is
not arisen (anuppanno) in another body, for this I say craving
is the fueL Indeed, Vaccha, craving is the fuel at that time.

In Kindred Sayings IV., F.L.Woodward translates 'anuppanno'
as 'rises up'. Here he must be following Leon Feer, the editor of
S.IV., who says that 'The true reading ought to be anuppatto'
(my emphasis), thus making the word into the past participle
of 'anuptipu{Uitr, 'attains', rather than the negative past participle of
'uppajjati', 'arises'. The only actual variant reading at S.IV.399-400
is 'anupapanno', but this means practically the same as 'anuppanno',
which reading is also found in the commentary (S.A.III.114).10 Peer's
'ought', therefore, can only be based on a wish to defend Theravadin
orthodoxy on the question of an intennediary existence. This is hardly
a good reason for changing a reading, especially on such a contentious
issue! The text as it stands clearly refers to a time between the 'laying
aside' of the body, at death, and the 'arising' in a new one, and
likens this to a time when a flame is carried by the wind across a
gap.

(6.20) The time period before 'arising' cannot be construed as
that of gestation in the womb. • Arising' is an aspect of the third
phase of 'becoming', 'falling away and arising', and 'becoming' is
the condition for 'birth (jiiti)' in the Conditioned Arising sequence.
Such 'birth', though, refers to conception (or perhaps implantation),
as shown by its definition at 8.11.3: 'birth (jati), generation, descent
(okkanti), production, appearance (patubhavo) of personality-factors,
gaining of sense-spheres'. Here 'okkanti' is linguistically equivalent
to 'avakkanti', the word used for the 'descent' of discernment into
the womb at the start of an organism's development in the womb
(Para.6.9), and for the 'descent' of the 'embryo' which takes place
when there is sexual intercourse at the right time in a woman's
monthly cycle (M.I.265-66). The "gaining ofsense-spheres', i.e. the
development of sense-organs is seen, by the different schools of
Buddhism, as taking place from conception onwards. In the
Theravadin Abhidhamma, the mind-organ and body-organ (of sensitivity
to touch) are said to be present from the beginning of
pregnancy, while the others develop later; an opposing Buddhist view
which it refers to is that all the sense-organs are present from the
beginning (Kvu.493-94). It can thus be seen that 'birth' refers to
the process beginning at conception or at implantation, and that the
'falling away and arising' which conditions it must thus be prior to
conception/implantation; though probably immediately leading up to
it, with 'arising' actually equivalent to 'birth'. A period between the
'laying aside' of one's body in death, and conception in a new life
is thus clearly referred to.

[xenocross]

(6.ll) A passage cited by the Sammitiyas, 11 Piirva§ailas 12 and
Sarvistividins (L' AK.II.37) in support of the intermediary existence
is one concerning 'NotHetumers': the type of saints who will not
'return' to rebirth in the sense--desire realm of humans etc., as they
are almost Arahats (those who have experienced nibbt'Jna). The
passage is found at D.lll.237:
Five classes of persons who become Non-returners: those who
attain nibbiina inbetween (antarti-parinibbt'Jyi); those who attain
nibbt'Jna cutting short (upahacca- ); those who attain it without
(further) activity (asalithtira-); those who attain it with (further)
activity (sasa~ra-); 'those going up-stream to Akanittha [the
highest of the 'five pure abodes', where only Non-returners are
reborn (also at 0.111.237)].
On its own, however, this passage does not prove that an intennediary
existence was accepted in the early Suttas. It does do so, though,
when supplemented by similar passages.
(6.ll) S.V.69-70 discusses the five types of Non-returners, in the
same order as at D.lll.237, listing them after someone who has
become an Arahat 'at the time of dying': clearly this implies that
the order represents a decreasing speed of spiritual attainment.
This would certainly make it likely that that the first of the five
types of Non-returners attains nibbt'Jna 'inbetween' death and
rebirth. The Interpretation given in the Theravidin Abhidhamma
and commentaries, though, is that this Non-returner attains nibbtina
immediately after 'arising' in a new rebirth, or at some time
before the middle of the life-span there (Pug.16 and A.A.IV.7). Less
contentiously, the next of the Non-returners is seen as one who
comes to attain nibbtina between the mid-point of his life span
and his death; the fifth type Is one who is reborn in each of the
five •pure abodes • until he attains nibbiina in the last of these
(Pug.l7).
(6.13) The above Theravidin interpretation of one who 'attains
nibbana inbetween', however, can be seen from A.IV.70-4. to be a
rather weak and strained one. 13 This passage discusses the five kinds
of Non-returners, and compares them, respectively, to:

Ia. a bit which comes off from a hot, beaten iron slab, and then
cools down;
I b. a bit which comes off, flies up and then cools down;
lc. a bit which comes off, flies up, and then cools down before
cutting into the ground (anupahacca-talaf{'l).
2. a bit which cools after cutting into the ground.
3. a bit which flies up and falls on a little fuel, igniting it, then
cools down after the fuel gets used up.
4. a bit which falls on a large heap of fuel, but cools down after it
is used up.
5. a bit which flies up and falls on a heap of fuel such that a frre
spreads, but then goes out when it reaches e.g. water or rock.

The Theravidin interpretation of the antarii-parinibbayr Nonreturner
hardly fits this illustration. Not to 'cut into the ground'
means, surely, not to begin a new rebirth. In the case of Nonreturners,
there is not even any question of whether this might
mean conception or leaving the womb: they are of immediate 'spontaneous
arising (opapiitiko)' (M.I.465), rather than being born from
a womb or egg (M.I.73). Thus to 'cut into the ground' alludes to
the very start of a rebirth. For the 'frre' to spread and then go out
(illustration 5, above) means to go through several rebirths before
the Non-returner 'cools (nibbayatt)' by attaining nibbiina. As the
Theravadin interpretation of the antarii-parinibbiiyi (la-c.) is that
he attains nibbiina at some time between the start and middle of
the next life, and the 'cutting-short (upahacca-)' Non-returner (2)
attains it after this, then the 'cutting into the ground (upahaccatalatp)'
of the simile would have to represent the middle of this life,
which seems most artificial. Even the commentary (A.A.IV.39) sees
similes la-c. as involving a 'bit' which is still in 'space', 'not having
reached the earth'; reaching the earth would most naturally apply to
the very start of a life. The antarii-parinibbiiyi must thus be one who
attains nibbiina after death and before any rebirth.

(6.24) A.II.l34 shows that the between-lives period in which the
antarii-parinibbiiyi Non-returner attains nibbiina is in fact called 'becoming'
(bhava). The passage refers to three kinds of spiritual fetters:
i) those binding to the lower shore (i.e. to the sense-desire world:
a Non-returner is defined as one who is free of these fetters);
ii) those 'of a kind to take up arising';
iii) those 'of a kind to take up becoming'.

[xenocross]

The fust fetters are abandoned by one 'going up-stream to Akanittha',
i.e. by the least advanced Non-returner; the fust two fetters are abandoned
by the antard-parinibbllyi Non-returner, and all three are
abandoned by the Arahat. The above distinction between 'becoming'
and 'arising' is most instructive. The 'up-stream' Non-returner is
clearly not beyond 'arising' in a rebirth, for he has ahead of him
several rebirths in the 'pure abodes', ending in Akani!tha. Only the
highest kind of Non-returner is beyond such 'arising' (uppatti-). He
is not an Arahat, though: one who has destroyed fetters leading to
'becoming'. As an Arahat is one who has attained nibbllna in his
present life, even up to the moment of death (Para.6.22), the highest
Non-returner must attain nibbdna after his death but before 'arising'
in any rebirth, this period being called 'becoming'.l4
(6.25) It can thus be seen that the 'early Suttas' did accept a
between-lives state, known as 'becoming',1s in which it is possible
for a Non-returner to attain nibbllna. An Arahat, though, attains
nibbdna in life, so as not to enter 'becoming', while most beings
pass through it and go on to arise in a rebirth.


THE NATURE OF THE INTERMEDIARY
EXISTENCE

( 6.26) It can be seen that an intermediary existence would act as
a transition between often disparate forms of rebirth. It would thus
be both a vehicle for transferring the continuity of character and
also a time for the necessary re-adjustment. 16 The similes la-c. in
Para 6.23 indicate that it consists of three successive phases, and
Para.6.15 provides terms which must be seen as names for these
phases: 'inclination', 'coming and going' and 'falling away and
arising'.

(6.27) Among the powers attributed to the Buddha and some
Arahats is that of the knowledge of how living beings are reborn:
knowledge of their 'coming and going and falling away and arising'
(0.1.162). At 0.1.83, knowledge of 'falling away and arising' is
likened to a man seeing that 'these men enter (pavisanti) a house,
these men leave (nikkhamanll) it, these men wander the carriage-road
track, and these are sat in the midst where four roads meet'. Here,
of course, the language of 'entering' and 'leaving' is reminiscent of
0.11.334 (Para 6.7), on the 'life-principle' of a dead person. The
simile shows that the three phases of 'becoming' are seen as like
leaving a house, wandering about on a road, and then sitting down

'in the midst where four roads meet'. It is worth noting, here, that
S.IV.194-95 likens a person's body to a border-town and his discernment
to the 'Lord' of such a town, he being sat 'in the midst, where
four roads meet' (representing the four physical elements). The
becoming seated 'in the midst ... • of 0.1.83, then, represents discernment
coming to be established in a new personality, after wandering
in search of 'it'. Another simile for knowledge of beings' rebirths
likens it to the knowledge of a man standing between two houses,
who would 'see men entering a house and leaving it, and going back
and forth and wandering across' (M.I.279). This simile emphasizes
the mid-stage of becoming as one of wandering and wavering, indeed
one of coming and going. Similarly M.l.261 (Para 6.13) refers to
beings 'seeking to be (sambhavesinatp)', who must clearly be those
in the intermediary existence.17

(6.28) It would thus seem reasonable to see the three stages of
this existence as:
i) 'inclination': leaving the body with a desire for a further rebirth,
like a man leaving a house, or a bit flying off a hot, beaten piece
of iron;
ii) 'coming and going': wandering back and forth seeking a rebirth,
like a man wandering on a road or between houses, or a hot iron
bit that flies up in the air;
iii) 'falling away and arising': falling from one's previous state, one's
previous identity, into a new rebirth, like a man settling down
in square or entering a house; or a hot iron bit falling and cutting
into the earth.

As shown in Para 6.19, the whole between-lives state is likened to
that of a leaping flame driven and fuelled by the wind, representing
craving. That is, craving provides the impetus and energy to seek
another rebirth, and the intermediary existence is flavoured by such
craving. As in Para 6.16, craving is the 'moisture' for becoming, and
discernment is its 'seed', so that discernment, will and aspiration
come to be 'supported' in another rebirth.
(6.29) The between-lives state need not be seen as a what we
call a 'fully conscious' state. 0.11.334 (Para 6.7) talks of the lifeprinciple
as leaving a person either in dreaming or death. Other
passages show that the 'early Suttas' talked of going to sleep and
dying in similar ways:

i) 0.1.333-34 uses the expression 'gone to one's day-bed (divaseyya'(
l)' for taking a siesta, while Sn.29 says 'I go no more to
a womb-bed (gabbha-seyyaT(l)' in the sense of 'I will not be
reborn'.
ii) 'Okkamati' is used both of the 'descent' of discernment into the
womb at conception (Para 6.9) and also of 'falling' into sleep
(Vin.I.I5).
(6.30) As will be argued in chapter 10, the discernment found in
(deep) sleep and at the death-moment is seen, in the Theravada
school, as of a kind which is radiantly 'brightly shining' (pabhassara).
This makes sense, from the Theravada perspective, of the
experience of a radiant light which the 'Near-death Experience' literature
says is reported by many people after they are resuscitated after
nearly dying. It also makes sense of the reference in the Bardo ThOtrol
('Tibetan Book of the Dead') to people confronting a pure white light
in the intermediary existence: in the fmt of the three stages of this,
the mind is said to be in an unconscious and luminous state which
is somehow equated with Amitabha, 'Infinite Radiance', Buddha
(Freemantle and Trungpa, 1978: 37). Such ideas also seem to connect
with the idea, in other Mahayana Buddhist texts, that this Buddha
will come to meet his devotees at death.
(6.31) Returning to the 'early Suttas', then, they see the betweenlives
state of becoming as entered when, fuelled by craving for
rebirth, discernment, the main process comprising the life-principle,
leaves the body. In a dream-like existence, it then wanders about
seeking a new life, kept going by craving and accompanied by will
and aspiration. On finding a new life, it falls into the womb (in the
case of rebirths involving this), and sets off the production of a new
mind-and-body, which had been craved for. This all takes place, of
course, within the parameters set by karma, the 'field' in which the
'seed' of discernment grows (Para 6.16). As for the duration of such
an intermediary existence, the opinions cited in later texts is that of
a week or more (K vu.A.l 06-07) or: as long as it takes to unite the
conditions for a new birth; seven days, seven weeks; very quickly
(L' AK.II.48-9).

[xenocross]

THE GANDHABBA: SPIRIT-BEING OF THE
INTERMEDIARY EXISTENCE

(6.32) Further light is shed on the intennediary existence by examining
the nature and role of the gandhabba. This is referred to at
M.I.26~. which is cited by Sammityas and Sarvastivadins in
support of the intennediary existence: for they equate the gandharva
(Sanskrit equivalent of Pali gandhabba) with this. 18 In other contexts,
the gandhabbas are seen as the lowest kind of god (D.ll.212), as
'going through the air' (A.II.39), and as living on the odour (gandha)
of roots, heart-wood, pith, sap, leaves and flowers (S.ID.250).19 At
the M.l.265-66 passage, the following is said:

Monks, it is on the conjunction of three things that there is
descent of the embryo (gabbhass-iivakkanll) ... if, monks, there
is, here, a coitus of the parents, and it is the mother's season,
and a gandhabba is present, it is on the conjunction of these
things that there is descent of the embryo. 20

This passage clearly deals with how conception takes place. The
Theraviidin commentary on it says: ' "Gandhabba" is the being going
there. "Is present" it is not that he remains in the proximity observing
the coitus of the parents, but what is implied is that a certain being
is having rebirth in that situation, being driven by the mechanism of
karma' (M.A.TI.310). This, though, does little to lessen the text's
impression of a fully-fledged (between-lives) being as needing to be
present for conception to take place. In a Freudian-sounding passage,
Vasubandhu gives the Sarvastivadin view, which does see a being
as observing the coitus of his future parents: a male is sexually
attracted to his future mother, and jealous of the father, while a female
is attracted to the father, and jealous of the mother (L'AK.TI.50-l).

(6.33) It is notable that discemment-tenninology is not used in the
M.I.26~ passage, as it is in the 0.11.62-3 passage on the 'descent'
of discernment into the womb (Para.6.9). M.l.265-66 is a continuation
from the Buddha's rebuke of Sati's ideas on discernment (Para
6.13), and follows the rejection of speculations on an unchanging 'I'
linking past, present and future. This suggests that the passage was
phrased in such a way as to avoid any impression that discernment,
alone and unaided, links different lives together. The between-lives
discernment is not an independent entity, a Self, but part of a kind of
being, a gandhabba. When this discernment descends into a womb,
it does not do so alone, but as part of an 'embryo'. This terminology
of "gandhabba' and 'embryo' must be seen as both exact and deliiJ..
erate: a passage on a misconception about discernment and rebirth is
hardly the place for 'loose' or inexact language. As part of a gandhabba
or of an 'embryo', the between-lives discernment must, clearly,
be dependent on other factors which compose these, and not be a Self
which depends only on itself. The Sarvastivadins, in fact, saw the
intermediary existence. i.e. gandhabba, as having the five personality-
factors (L 'AK..11.32), which clearly follows from a statement at
s.m.ss. that one cannot 'show forth the coming or going or falling
away and arising •.• of discernment' apart from the the four other personality-
factors.

(6.34) The statement that the four nutriments are for 'the assistance
of those seeking to be' (M.I.261) also shows that the
between-lives gandhabba must have some sort of body; for otherwise
it would need no 'material/food-nutriment'. Now this nutriment
can be 'gross' or 'subtle (sukhumo)' (M.I.261). For an 'odour' eating
gandhabba. it will surely be of a subtle kind 21: thus its 'body' will
be a 'subtle' one. Indeed, the Sarvistividins (L'AK.11.122) and
Sammitiyas saw a being in the intennediary existence as having a
'mind-made' body, with the latter saying that this was 'so subtle and
delicate that when it is on the ground, it would not (appear) different
from that' (SNS.200).22 As it has been seen that the mind-made body
and discernment are regarded as key aspects of the lifeprinciple,
and that the life-principle leaves the body at death
(Paras.6.5-7), such an idea seems plausible.
(US) Just as the life-principle has been seen as a kind of 'spirit'
(Pam.6.11), so may the between-lives gandhabba. This is because
of:

i) the subtle nature of the gandhabba;
ii) its being the cany-over from a dead person, after the discernment
life-principle has 'left' the body;
iii) its feeding on odour, i.e. on that which is known through the
nose: through which one also breathes in and out, in-spires and
ex-pires (dies!);
iv) its moving through the air (viha-);
v) the parallel of the between-lives state to the w;nd (vata)-blown
fire;
vi) the parallel of discernment, the main component of the betweenlives
state and the life-principle, to air or wind (Para.6.11 );

[xenocross]

The English word 'spirit', meaning the life-breath of a person, neatly
encompasses these various notions.

(6.36) While it has been seen that the later Theravadin orthodox
view does not accept an intennediary existence in which the gandhabba-
spirit exists, it is notable that such an idea is present in
'popular' Buddhism of Theravada lands. As reported by Melford
Spiro, the Bunnese believe that a 'butterfly spirit (leikpya)' leaves
the body at death and needs the broken-off branch of a tree (gandhabbas
live on the odour of such things!) on which to rest for a
week. 21

(6.37) The gandhabba-spirit, of course, is not-Self: not an eternal
Self or eternal soul. Scepticism on the notion of a gandhabba as notSelf,
however, has been expressed by John Garrett Jones. He feels
that the Buddha wanted to 'both have his cake and eat it' in accepting
rebirth which necessitates some 'pseudo-self' to be reborn and
his saying that there is 'no atman to be rebom'(l979: 150 & lSI).
The gandhabba is, for him, such a 'pseudo-self', on which he says:
'I can see no way, however, of reconciling the belief in a surviving
gandhabba with the much more rigorous doctrine of the khandhas'
(i.e. of the personality-factors as not-Self; p. 202). As has been seen,
though, the gandhabba is also composed of personality-factors, and
this implies the mutual dependence of such components, and thus
their not being a Self. The gandhabba is not a 'pseudo-self', but can
be seen as a genuine empirical 'self', as found between-lives. It is,
though, no metaphysical Self: all its components are inevitably impermanent,
dukkha and not-Self.

(6.38) Karel Werner is thus right to criticize the popular contrast
which sees Hinduism as teaching a 'transmigrating personality', taken
as the eternal iitman or Self, and Buddhism as denying this (1988:
94). Even for Hinduism, the 'transmigrating personality' is of a
changeable, composite nature, the 'subtle (su/qma-)' or 'characteristic
(linga-)' body (sarira), and is not the eternal Self, which only
underlies it (1988: 84). For Buddhism, there is a kind of 'transmigrating
personality' (or, rather, a transmigrating process-duster),
the life-principle or gandhabba-spirit; but it has nothing to do with
a supposed unchanging Self, for which Buddhism fmds no evidence.
Werner's suggestion that it is an empty 'personality structure'
also seems inappropriate (Para.4.17). Theravada wariness against
accepting a between-lives state, and a being existing in it, may well
have been because such a being might be construed as the 'person'
of the Personalists (Para 1.36). As the Personalists seem to have
equated such a 'person' with the life-principle, which was also easily
mistaken for a Self, the Theravadins were also very wary about this
term. The life-principle of the 'early Suttas', however, is not-Self,
and, though it is not the same as or totally different from the 'mortal
body', it is the same as processes such as discernment, vitality, heat
and the mind-made body. It thus is unlike the Personalists' 'person',
which was seen as 'not the same as or different from' the
personality-factors, both bodily and mental. For the 'early Suttas', a
'person' is a web of interacting processes, both in life and between
lives; it is not something 'neither the same as or different from' these
that owns them and acts through them. It is notable, though, that the
best evidence for acceptance of a between-Jives state is in the
Aliguttara Nikiiya, and that the term 'person' (puggala) occurs
frequently in this. It is possible that the Personalist view grew up
among monks specialising in reciting this Nikiiya (or its close parallel,
the Ekottara Agama), partly because they misconstrued the nature of
the between-lives state.

THE SELFLESS MIND
Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana
in Early Buddhism
Peter Harvey

[seniya]

Pertanyaannya sekarang, dari mana konsep antarabhava (intermediate state) dalam Buddhisme awal ini berasal? Sedangkan Brahmanisme sebelum masa Sang Buddha sendiri tidak mengajarkan konsep ini (AFAIK, CMIIW). Dalam artikel Wiki tentang intermediate state kita hanya menemukan agama-agama Timur Tengah (Yahudi, kr****n, Islam) selain Buddhisme yang mengajarkan demikian [walaupun konsep keadaan antara setelah kematian dalam agama-agama ini sedikit berbeda dengan Buddhisme, namun pada intinya ini adalah keadaan antara sebelum benar-benar terlahir kembali atau masuk surga/neraka abadi pada hari penghakiman]. Hmmm...   

[Kelana]

Pertanyaannya sekarang, dari mana konsep antarabhava (intermediate state) dalam Buddhisme awal ini berasal? Sedangkan Brahmanisme sebelum masa Sang Buddha sendiri tidak mengajarkan konsep ini (AFAIK, CMIIW). Dalam artikel Wiki tentang intermediate state kita hanya menemukan agama-agama Timur Tengah (Yahudi, kr****n, Islam) selain Buddhisme yang mengajarkan demikian [walaupun konsep keadaan antara setelah kematian dalam agama-agama ini sedikit berbeda dengan Buddhisme, namun pada intinya ini adalah keadaan antara sebelum benar-benar terlahir kembali atau masuk surga/neraka abadi pada hari penghakiman]. Hmmm...   

Apa dasarnya Sdr. Shinichi menyatakan konsep antarabhava (intermediate state) ada dalam Buddhisme awal ?

[seniya]

Apa dasarnya Sdr. Shinichi menyatakan konsep antarabhava (intermediate state) ada dalam Buddhisme awal ?

http://dhammacitta.org/dcpedia/Kelahiran_Kembali_dan_Keadaan_Antara_Dalam_Buddhisme_Awal_(Sujato)

Namun tentu saja konsep keadaan antara dalam Buddhisme awal ini bersifat samar-samar karena masih bersifat embrio, sedangkan aliran-aliran awal yang mendukungnya mengembangkannya lebih lanjut, namun aliran-aliran awal lainnya menolak konsep ini karena kesamaran konsep itu sendiri dalam Buddhisme awal.

[Kelana]

http://dhammacitta.org/dcpedia/Kelahiran_Kembali_dan_Keadaan_Antara_Dalam_Buddhisme_Awal_(Sujato)

Namun tentu saja konsep keadaan antara dalam Buddhisme awal ini bersifat samar-samar karena masih bersifat embrio, sedangkan aliran-aliran awal yang mendukungnya mengembangkannya lebih lanjut, namun aliran-aliran awal lainnya menolak konsep ini karena kesamaran konsep itu sendiri dalam Buddhisme awal.

IC.
Tapi bagi saya menjadi embrio pun belum, dan artikel Bhikkhu Sujato masih bisa diperdebatkan karena alasannya masih sangat lemah, bahkan sudah saya sangkal di topik ini juga, seperti misalnya cuplikan Kutuhalasāla Sutta tentang meletakkan tubuh yang dianggap yg bersangkutan sudah mati. Karenanya saya mendahului dengan menyodorkan kesepakatan mengenai apa itu mati dalam pengertian Buddhis. Bhikkhu Sujato tidak membahas mengenai hal ini sehingga konsep pemikiran akan kematian yang digunakan adalah konsep umum, yaitu tubuh mati berarti mati, atau tubuh diletakkan berarti mati. Dengan demikian apapun yang dikatakan dalam sutta yang berkaitan dengan peletakkan tubuh atau meninggalkan tubuh, melepaskan tubuh akan diartikan sebagai sudah mati. Dan konsep ini diakui atau tidak, sedikit atau banyak, sudah dibawa di alam bawah sadar dari mereka yang pernah berada pada lingkungan dan pendidikan yang mengusung konsep mati seperti ini.

Sayangnya pendapat Bhikkhu Sujato ini sering tidak ditelaah lagi oleh banyak di antara dari kita. Kita langsung copy paste dan menganggapnya 100% pasti benar dan menjadikannya rujukan karena ia seorang bhikkhu, lebih parahnya lagi jika alasan karena ia adalah orang barat.

Begitu juga dengan artikel lainnya dari Sdr. Xenocross, sama intinya, yaitu konsep kematian yang menggunakan konsep non-Buddhis, dan juga istilah-istilah teknis lain yang disalahartikan.

Jadi kalau dikatakan Buddhisme awal mengusung antarabhava sebagai suatu alam, sampai sekarang saya belum sependapat.


Thanks

[seniya]

IC.
Tapi bagi saya menjadi embrio pun belum, dan artikel Bhikkhu Sujato masih bisa diperdebatkan karena alasannya masih sangat lemah, bahkan sudah saya sangkal di topik ini juga, seperti misalnya cuplikan Kutuhalasāla Sutta tentang meletakkan tubuh yang dianggap yg bersangkutan sudah mati. Karenanya saya mendahului dengan menyodorkan kesepakatan mengenai apa itu mati dalam pengertian Buddhis. Bhikkhu Sujato tidak membahas mengenai hal ini sehingga konsep pemikiran akan kematian yang digunakan adalah konsep umum, yaitu tubuh mati berarti mati, atau tubuh diletakkan berarti mati. Dengan demikian apapun yang dikatakan dalam sutta yang berkaitan dengan peletakkan tubuh atau meninggalkan tubuh, melepaskan tubuh akan diartikan sebagai sudah mati. Dan konsep ini diakui atau tidak, sedikit atau banyak, sudah dibawa di alam bawah sadar dari mereka yang pernah berada pada lingkungan dan pendidikan yang mengusung konsep mati seperti ini.

Sayangnya pendapat Bhikkhu Sujato ini sering tidak ditelaah lagi oleh banyak di antara dari kita. Kita langsung copy paste dan menganggapnya 100% pasti benar dan menjadikannya rujukan karena ia seorang bhikkhu, lebih parahnya lagi jika alasan karena ia adalah orang barat.

Begitu juga dengan artikel lainnya dari Sdr. Xenocross, sama intinya, yaitu konsep kematian yang menggunakan konsep non-Buddhis, dan juga istilah-istilah teknis lain yang disalahartikan.

Jadi kalau dikatakan Buddhisme awal mengusung antarabhava sebagai suatu alam, sampai sekarang saya belum sependapat.


Thanks

Ok, then we agree to disagree

[K.K.]

Bisa dilihat misalnya di Kathavatthu terdapat argumentasi menentang Sammitiya berkenaan dengan antarabhava. Jadi sejak awal memang sudah ada perbedaan mengenai antarabhava. Argumen sebaliknya sepertinya ada di dalam Sammitiyanikayasastra.

Menurut komentar Prakaranapada (salah satu Abhidharma Sarvastivada), Pancavastuvibhasa, sekte-sekte awal yang menolak antarabhava adalah Mahasangika, Mahisasaka, dan Vibhajjavada.

Basha mengemukakan dua sutra tentang antarabhava:
1. Asvalayanasutra (Assalayanasutta), di mana Buddha khotbah tentang kasta dan bertanya ketika Gandharva siap memasuki rahim, apakah orang lain tahu datangnya dari kasta apa, dari arah mana. Ini menunjukkan suatu kondisi antara kelahiran.
2. Satpurusagatisutra (satta purisagati sutta), tentang antaraparinirvana yang sudah dibahas di atas, lengkap dengan perumpamaan serpihan api.

Pendukung argumen ini memprotes bahwa penentang antarabhava seperti sengaja mengabaikan kedua sutra ini.

Belakangan, konsep Antarabhava ini berkembang lebih jauh dan membahas misalnya tujuan alam mana saja yang bisa melalui antarabhava, dan mana yang benar-benar langsung; dan lain-lain.

Jadi memang pembahasan antarabhava ini sudah ada sejak era Buddhisme Awal.