Filosofi Middle Way Nagarjuna

[seniya]

Milinda Panha beberapa kali menyebut kata "sabhava" tetapi waktu itu belum masuk ke doktrin svabhava yang umum ditemui di abhidharma kemudian. Saya kurang tahu, tapi mungkin itu menandakan cikal bakal berkembangnya doktrin svabhava

doktrin svabhava dalam buddhisme misalnya dianut oleh Sarvastivada yang mengatakan: Semua dharma di tiga masa sesungguhnya  ada
di theravada, ada di karya komentar vissudhi magga yang sering menyebut sabhava
Dan biarpun dikatakan "sungguh ada", konsep svabhava buddhis masih mengatakan anatta dan anicca. Berbeda dengan non-buddhis yang mengatakan atta = svabhava.
Semakin dibaca semakin pusing.

Setahuku memang yang ditentang Nagarjuna dengan filosofi Madhyamaka adalah ajaran svabhava dari Abhidharma Sarvastivada:

Selain itu, Sarvastivada mengajarkan svabhava (sifat intrinsik fenomena) yang tidak berubah selama tiga periode waktu; svabhava inilah yang membedakan secara unik satu fenomena dengan fenomena lainnya. Menurut Sarvastivada, ini bukan berarti sifat fenomena (dhamma) adalah kekal sehingga menyalahi hukum ketidakkekalan (anicca/anitya), tetapi fenomena tetap tunduk pada kemunculan dan kelenyapan, hanya saja sifat intrinsiknya tidak berubah sepanjang waktu, seperti emas yang berubah bentuk menjadi perhiasan, mangkuk, dst, entitas/sifat intrinsik emas tersebut tidak berubah walaupun mengalami perubahan bentuk. Ajaran inilah yang ditentang banyak aliran lainnya karena seakan-akan menyatakan adanya suatu inti yang kekal dalam fenomena sehingga menyalahi ajaran bukan aku (anatta/anatman). Untuk menyanggah ajaran svabhava ini, aliran Mahayana yang muncul kemudian mengajarkan bahwa sifat intrinsik semua fenomena adalah kosong (sunyata svabhava). Inilah cikal bakal ajaran kekosongan yang terkenal dalam Mahayana saat ini.

Sumber: Sarvastivada Abhidharma

[K.K.]

ente yang kata-kan bahwa apa yang tercantum di milinda panha itu doktrin sabhava, padahal yang ada di bab Kesempurnaan Sang Buddha adalah berbeda... tidak ada konteks membahas doktrin sabhava... dan diberbagai terjemahan, tidak ada di-bahas soal doktrin sabhava...

-----------------

Jadi inget anggapan "cocoklogi" abhidhamma di bhikkhuni vibhanga (vinaya), tapi kok bisa yah muncul penggunaan "cocoklogi" soal sabhava di Milinda panha.... (cuma 1 kata saja), dan tidak nyambung soal doktrin sabhava yang dimaksud-kan sebagai realitas sejati....

Dalam Milindapanha memang tidak ada penjelasan detailnya soal doktrin sabhava, tapi kata itu muncul sesuai perkembangan doktrin saat itu, maka bisa dilihat dalam nikaya awal tidak ada penyebutan sabhava sama sekali, tapi setelah perkembangan doktrin sabhava (di India dulu perdebatan dan argumentasi sangat umum, saling menyerang dan bertahan dengan tesis masing-masing), barulah pengertian itu dimasukkan dalam tafsir abhidhamma dan istilahnya kembali muncul dalam doktrin belakangan seperti Milindapanha tersebut.

Berbeda dengan cocoklogi term "Abhidhamma" di vinaya dengan "Abhidhamma Pitaka", yang pada jaman Buddha jelas-jelas belum ada. (Kecuali menurut catatan sektarian Theravada, tentunya hehehe)

Lucunya, saya baca perkembangan doktrin sabhava di forum diskusi abhidhamma yang juga melibatkan tulisan bhikkhu Theravada. Melihat pengetahuan dan cara bicara bro dilbert yang makin lama makin kelihatan aslinya, saya sudah pada kesimpulan tidak ada gunanya melanjutkan diskusi. Jadi maaf kalau berikutnya saya tidak tanggapi yah.

[K.K.]

Milinda Panha beberapa kali menyebut kata "sabhava" tetapi waktu itu belum masuk ke doktrin svabhava yang umum ditemui di abhidharma kemudian. Saya kurang tahu, tapi mungkin itu menandakan cikal bakal berkembangnya doktrin svabhava

Svabhava bukan doktrin khusus sekte tertentu seperti Theravada, tapi setiap sekte punya pandangan tersendiri tentang svabhava, dan sekte-sekte Abhidharmik justru memang membahas svabhava ini dalam tafsir abhidharmanya. Svabhava ini yang membahas karakteristik mendasar fenomena yang muncul, yang kemudian berinteraksi dengan fenomena lainnya membentuk samskara/bentukan.

doktrin svabhava dalam buddhisme misalnya dianut oleh Sarvastivada yang mengatakan: Semua dharma di tiga masa sesungguhnya  ada
di theravada, ada di karya komentar vissudhi magga yang sering menyebut sabhava
Dan biarpun dikatakan "sungguh ada", konsep svabhava buddhis masih mengatakan anatta dan anicca. Berbeda dengan non-buddhis yang mengatakan atta = svabhava.
Semakin dibaca semakin pusing.

Betul, bahkan pudgalavada yang memiliki pandangan ada 'pudgala' yang bukan sama bukan berbeda dengan pancaskandha saja memegang "anicca-dukkha-anatta", semua sekte awal ini menerima dan memegang prinsip doktrin Buddhisme Awal, namun mereka menafsirkannya dengan cara berbeda saja.

Perbedaan yang bisa dilihat adalah kalau di Theravada fenomena dianalisis dan dipecah menjadi fenomena yang lebih kecil, kemudian dipecah lagi menjadi yang lebih kecil sampai akhirnya ada satu bagian yang tidak lagi terbagi. Nah fenomena ini yang kemudian memiliki ciri seperti misalnya rupa-kalapa memiliki 3 kategori dan punya karakteristik tertentu. Ciri ini yang dimaksud svabhava, dan dalam Madhyamaka, karena fenomena muncul bergantungan, tergantung pula dengan persepsi dan indriah, maka sebetulnya tidak ada suatu ciri sejati yang dikenali dari bahkan fenomena terkecil tersebut, maka disebut hakekatnya "sunya" (kosong).

[xenocross]

Ketika dikatakan "sunyata adalah bentuk", pernyataan ini tidak seharusnya dipahami secara harfiah. Maksudnya adalah, berkat adanya kesunyataan, maka ada bentuk. Pada dasarnya, hanya ada dua cara eksistensi -- apakah benda tersebut sepenuhnya berdiri sendiri dengan inheren (tidak berkaitan dengan yang lainnya) atau dia bergantung kepada benda lain, dengan kata lain dia sunya atau keberadaannya tidak inheren.

Tentu saja penjelasan yang kedua adalah pandangan yang benar. Karena alasan inilah, yaitu misalnya bentuk tidak memiliki keberadaan yang sejati-lah, sehingga dia eksis/ada. Jika dia sepenuhnya berdiri sendiri, maka dia tidak dapat dihasilkan dari sebab dan kondisi. Oleh karena itu, dengan alasan demikianlah, maka bentuk tidak memiliki keberadaan yang sejati karena dia dapat dan memang bergantung pada misalnya, sebab yang menghasilkannya.

Oleh karena itu, karena ketiadaan kebebasan ini maka sesungguhnya dia muncul dengan cara bergantung pada hal lain; yakni bergantung pada fenomena yang lain. Ada sebuah ungkapan yang mengatakan "semua fenomena adalah perwujudan dari kesunyataan." Pernyataan ini juga jangan dimaknai secara harfiah. Apa yang sebenarnya dimaksud disini adalah: dikarenakan mereka sunya akan keberadaan yang inheren (svabhava/ atta) maka mereka bisa muncul, dihasilkan atau dapat eksis

Tak ada benda apapun yang dapat sepenuhnya muncul tanpa bergantung pada sesuatu yang lain. Karena semua fenomena tidak memiliki eksistensi yang mutlak, maka mereka dapat eksis -- mereka eksis dalam cara yang tidak mutlak, berkaitan dengan ketergantungan akan hal lain. Jey Tsongkhapa, dalam ulasannya terhadap Prajnamula, mengatakan bahwa hanya ada dua kemungkinan cara eksistensi --  apakah dia eksis sendiri sepenuhnya atau eksis berkaitan dengan fenomena yang lain. Namun beliau menyatakan bahwa tidak ada satu benda tunggal apapun di dunia ini yang bisa muncul dengan sendirinya. Sesungguhnya, segala sesuatu muncul bergantung kepada fenomena yang lain. Pada dasarnya segala fenomena dikatakan muncul karena dia ditanggapi oleh persepsi. Lagipula, agar sesuatu bisa eksis, dia juga harus bergantung kepada penamaannya. Karena itu, segala sesuatu muncul bergantung kepada persepsi yang menanggapinya dan juga berdasarkan penamaannya.

Ada sebuah cerita yang berhubungan dengan topik ini yang mungkin bisa sedikit membantu. Suatu hari saya diundang untuk memberikan kuliah pada Institut Budaya Dunia India di Bangalore, India Selatan. Kebanyakan orang yang menghadiri kuliah tersebut adalah penganut Hindu yang berasal dari berbagai aliran. Saya sedang membicarakan mengenai ketanpa-akuan dari segala fenomena. Kemudian, saat sesi tanya jawab, seorang lelaki tua berdiri dan mengatakan "Tidaklah mungkin bahwa semua fenomena tanpa diri (aku/atta). Misalnya Ishvara, Sang pencipta dunia, memiliki diri (aku) dan tidak bergantung pada yang lain"

Saya mengatakan, "Bagaimana dengan kenyataan bahwa dia tidak memiliki diri yang sejati karena dia bergantung pada fenomena yang lain seperti persepsi Anda terhadapnya dan nama "Ishvara" yang Anda berikan padanya?" Beliau menggelengkan kepalanya, dan terus memegang pendapatnya. Namun saya lanjut mengatakan,
"Jika dia tidak bergantung kepada persepsi yang Anda padanya dan nama yang Anda berikan padanya, maka bagaimana orang lain pertama sekali mengetahui bahwa dia ada?"
Setelah pernyataan ini, ada beberapa menit semua terdiam dan kemudian dia menganggukkan kepalanya. Saya terkejut dengan kenyataan bahwa dia tiba-tiba mendapatkan pemahaman baru.


Transkrip ceramah Yang Mulia Dagpo Rinpoche tentang topik "Prajna Paramita Hrdaya Sutra", 16-19 November 2007, Kuala Lumpur

[dilbert]

Perbedaan yang bisa dilihat adalah kalau di Theravada fenomena dianalisis dan dipecah menjadi fenomena yang lebih kecil, kemudian dipecah lagi menjadi yang lebih kecil sampai akhirnya ada satu bagian yang tidak lagi terbagi.

saya baru tahu di Theravada ada pembagian-pembagian sampai ke bagian yang tidak terbagi lagi... apakah itu ? #mohon-pencerahannya.

[dilbert]

The Abhidhamma deals with realities existing in the ultimate sense, or paramattha dhamma in Pali. There are four such realities:
1. Citta, mind or consciousness, defined as 'that which knows or experiences' an object. Citta occurs as distinct momentary states of consciousness.
2. Cetasika, the mental factors that arise and occur along with the citta.
3. Rupa, physical phenomenon or material form.
4. Nibbana, the unconditioned state of bliss which is the final goal.
C
itta, the cetasika, and rupa are conditioned realities. They arise because of conditions sustaining them cease to continue to do so. They are impermanent states. Nibbana, on the other hand, is an unconditioned reality. It does not arise and, therefore, does not fall away. These four realities can be experienced regardless of the names we may choose to give them. Other than these realities, everything _ be it within ourselves or without, whether in the past, present or future, whether coarse or subtle, low or lofty, far or near _ is a concept and not an ultimate reality.
Citta, cetisaka(?), and Nibbana are also called nama. Nibbana is an unconditioned nama. The two conditioned nama, that is, cita and cetasika, together with rupa (form), make up psychophysical organisms, including human beings. Both mind and matter, or nama-rupa, are analysed in Abhidhamma as though under a microscope. Events connected with the process of birth and death are explained in detail. The Abhidhamma clarifies intricate points of the Dhamma and enables the arising of an understanding of reality, thereby setting forth in clear terms the Path of Emancipation. The realization we gain from the Abhidhamma with regard to our lives and the world is not in a conventional sense, but absolute reality.

-----

saya gak tahu darimana penafsiran di Abhidhamma ada dikatakan soal pembagian sampai ke bagian terkecil yang tidak dibagi lagi... dan kemudian ditafsirkan sebagai svabhava...

citta, cetasika --> impermanent states.

Nibbana --> unconditional states.

rupa --> conditional states.

yang mana-kah yang dimaksud dalam pembahasan di abhidhamma ada bagian yang terkecil yang tidak terbagi-bagi lagi, yang menjadi realitas sejati (baca : di-terjemahkan sebagai svabhava atau doktrin svabhava) ?

[xenocross]

The first supreme meaning or object to learn is citta. Before we come to citta, we want to emphasize and especially explain the Abhidhamma approach – as opposed to the Suttanta or Vinaya approach – is explaining the Dhammas in the sense of truth, as true object of perception, or true object of mind. Dhammas are that which have sabhava, or salakkhana, a very intriguing and complex word. It is, in a way, the understanding of what is sabhava, the self-nature. It is the root of all interpretation of the sabhava. Understanding sabhava is the root of all the different approaches we have in Buddhism as to the understanding of Dhamma and the way to liberation.

In the Hinayana school, or lesser vehicle school, as it is considered to be by the Mahayana scholars, the vehicle is the Arahant as opposed to the Mahayana where the vehicle is the Buddha. The criticism of the Mahayana – and in a way the whole structure of Mahayana – is based on the criticism of this concept of sabhava. But many Mahayana scholars criticize but have never studied Theravada, and thus, have a very serious misunderstanding of the Theravada Abhidhamma. They consider all the so-called Hinayana schools the same as Vaibhasika. The Mahayana scholars consider the idea of sabhava, the self-nature of entities, the same no matter whether it is from the Theravada or Sarvastivada school. In fact, there are some very important differences in the interpretation of how the sabhava is understood in the Theravada and in the Sarvastivada, or Vaibhasika, traditions. We will not go into detail on that.

What remains important to point out is that the paramatthas are the 4 supreme meanings or objects – Nibbana, citta, cetasika, and rupa. This, of course, is problematic, because there can be only one supreme meaning or object. It is very difficult to have many supremes. The relationship between the supreme of Nibbana and the supremes of citta, cetasika and rupa is not explained. Supreme object or meaning is understood in an ontological and epistemological sense, but what exactly the relation between the 4 different supremes and how we can have 4 different supremes is not mentioned.

What is understood is that when we understand these 4 supreme meanings and the 4 supreme objects, we can attain liberation. Some very important scholars have pointed out that the Abhidhamma approach, in a way, is a pluralistic approach. The Abhidhamma is linked to the Samkya philosophy, which is a similar approach. In Samkya, by understanding 25 tatvas (realities) we understand everything. In Abhidhamma, by understanding the 4 supreme objects or meanings we also understand everything.

We speak of two Nibbanas, one with the 5 aggregates of existence still remaining and one without the 5 aggregates of existence. But, Nibbana is only one. But, as we will see, the one citta (state of consciousness) becomes 89 or 121 cittas. This is the clarity of the Theravada Abhidhamma approach. Detailed analysis of the citta is based on very detailed analysis of the mind processes, of the cittavithis. This division of one citta into many cittas is not problematic, because a citta has only 1 characteristic differentiating the object, vijanati, so all these 81 or 121 cittas, states of consciousness, have only one characteristic of differentiating the object. But, when we come to the cetasikas (mental factors) we have 52 Dhammas, each with a different characteristic. A particularity of Theravada Abhidhamma, as opposed to the Sarvastivada Abhidhamma, is that all these Dhammas are not only discussed from the point of view of their own lakkhana (characeristic), but must also be understood from the view of rasa.

Rasa is a word very difficult to translated into English. This book translates it as function, but it means much more than just function. Literally, rasa means taste. And those who study Indian culture know the different types of music, medicine and experiences are classified into different rasas, different tastes. The function actually means the taste of the object, how one actually experiences it. This part of the analysis is also there in the Sarvastivada and Vaibhasika tradition. Even in the Yogacara tradition they discuss the Dhammas in the sense of lakkhana and rasa, characteristic and function, respectively.

What is particular about the Theravada approach is that this is not considered to be sufficient. There also has to be (proximate cause). Sorry, first I should say paccupatthana (manifestation), or how these Dhammas actually appear, how they establish themselves in our perception. Then, all of these Dhammas are everything that exists in the world, and everything only exists in interdependent origination. So, these salakkhanas, self-characteristics, according to the Theravada tradition, also only arise in interdependent origination, as opposed to the Sarvastivada tradition. The book is very emphatic on that fact. There are Theravadans who would agree salakkhanas are empty of interdependent nature, yet nevertheless, they have a lasting characteristic. Whether today, in the future, or in the past, the characteristic of earth remains hardness.

An intelligent man knows we can only experience hardness when we know softness, and without knowing hardness we cannot know softness. Similarly, heat being the self-characteristic of fire, every intelligent mans knows that we can only know heat when we know coolness. I know this book to be cool because my hand is warm. If I don’t know the hand being warm, I cannot know the coolness of this book. So, obviously, these salakkhanas (self-characteristics), the sabhava (self-natures) of these Dhammas are not meant as something existing independently in the three times, but only as it is understood in the Vaibhasika tradition, and as it is criticized by the Mahayana scholars. The Theravada tradition never committed itself to such an idea. So, as the Vissudhi Magga clearly explains, interdependent origination, their interdependent nature, is emptiness. In the ultimate sense, these Dhammas, even in the Theravada tradition, are considered empty, yet nevertheless have a real characteristic or self-nature, which is lasting.

To the students of Mahayana, the structure of these self-existing Dhammas, or self-existing characteristics, was smashed completely over hundreds of years and many endless disputes about which Dhamma has real characteristic and which does not, which is just a Dhamma of convenience and which really exists. This was a subject matter of endless discussion in the history of Dhamma. Each school of Buddhism had its own version of what was the real existing Dhamma and what was only a Dhamma of convenience.

Nagarjuna criticized and logically demolished the possibility of sabhava, self-existing nature. Logically, in the Buddhist sense, it is not tenable. In Mahayana Buddhism, there appeared disciples of Nagarjuna, like Chandrakirti and the Prasandrikas, who claimed that Dhammas have no nature whatsoever, that the nature of Dhammas is the nature of others, and whatever exists exists in the virtue of existence of others. So, this is the meaning of emptiness.

Some scholars, as you know, liked sabhava for convenience, merely for the sake of argument. Then, from the Yogacara school comes a very different interpretation: outer things have no nature at all, but that which has real nature is the mind and its mental factors. All that we understand in this world is just a manifestation of this mind.

Now, in the Theravada tradition we come to a middle position. The Theravada Abhidhamma is based on the analysis of these sabhava, real or existing or self natures, but these self-natures are definitely existing only in interdependence and cannot arise without the existence of other entities. So, this is an approach which is followed in our analysis, and with this understanding we come to the first supreme object or meaning in the world, citta.

http://www.phathue.com/buddhism/dharma-talks/abhidhamma-with-dhammadipa/

[K.K.]

The first supreme meaning or object to learn is citta. Before we come to citta, we want to emphasize and especially explain the Abhidhamma approach – as opposed to the Suttanta or Vinaya approach – is explaining the Dhammas in the sense of truth, as true object of perception, or true object of mind. Dhammas are that which have sabhava, or salakkhana, a very intriguing and complex word. It is, in a way, the understanding of what is sabhava, the self-nature. It is the root of all interpretation of the sabhava. Understanding sabhava is the root of all the different approaches we have in Buddhism as to the understanding of Dhamma and the way to liberation.

In the Hinayana school, or lesser vehicle school, as it is considered to be by the Mahayana scholars, the vehicle is the Arahant as opposed to the Mahayana where the vehicle is the Buddha. The criticism of the Mahayana – and in a way the whole structure of Mahayana – is based on the criticism of this concept of sabhava. But many Mahayana scholars criticize but have never studied Theravada, and thus, have a very serious misunderstanding of the Theravada Abhidhamma. They consider all the so-called Hinayana schools the same as Vaibhasika. The Mahayana scholars consider the idea of sabhava, the self-nature of entities, the same no matter whether it is from the Theravada or Sarvastivada school. In fact, there are some very important differences in the interpretation of how the sabhava is understood in the Theravada and in the Sarvastivada, or Vaibhasika, traditions. We will not go into detail on that.

What remains important to point out is that the paramatthas are the 4 supreme meanings or objects – Nibbana, citta, cetasika, and rupa. This, of course, is problematic, because there can be only one supreme meaning or object. It is very difficult to have many supremes. The relationship between the supreme of Nibbana and the supremes of citta, cetasika and rupa is not explained. Supreme object or meaning is understood in an ontological and epistemological sense, but what exactly the relation between the 4 different supremes and how we can have 4 different supremes is not mentioned.

What is understood is that when we understand these 4 supreme meanings and the 4 supreme objects, we can attain liberation. Some very important scholars have pointed out that the Abhidhamma approach, in a way, is a pluralistic approach. The Abhidhamma is linked to the Samkya philosophy, which is a similar approach. In Samkya, by understanding 25 tatvas (realities) we understand everything. In Abhidhamma, by understanding the 4 supreme objects or meanings we also understand everything.

We speak of two Nibbanas, one with the 5 aggregates of existence still remaining and one without the 5 aggregates of existence. But, Nibbana is only one. But, as we will see, the one citta (state of consciousness) becomes 89 or 121 cittas. This is the clarity of the Theravada Abhidhamma approach. Detailed analysis of the citta is based on very detailed analysis of the mind processes, of the cittavithis. This division of one citta into many cittas is not problematic, because a citta has only 1 characteristic differentiating the object, vijanati, so all these 81 or 121 cittas, states of consciousness, have only one characteristic of differentiating the object. But, when we come to the cetasikas (mental factors) we have 52 Dhammas, each with a different characteristic. A particularity of Theravada Abhidhamma, as opposed to the Sarvastivada Abhidhamma, is that all these Dhammas are not only discussed from the point of view of their own lakkhana (characeristic), but must also be understood from the view of rasa.

Rasa is a word very difficult to translated into English. This book translates it as function, but it means much more than just function. Literally, rasa means taste. And those who study Indian culture know the different types of music, medicine and experiences are classified into different rasas, different tastes. The function actually means the taste of the object, how one actually experiences it. This part of the analysis is also there in the Sarvastivada and Vaibhasika tradition. Even in the Yogacara tradition they discuss the Dhammas in the sense of lakkhana and rasa, characteristic and function, respectively.

What is particular about the Theravada approach is that this is not considered to be sufficient. There also has to be (proximate cause). Sorry, first I should say paccupatthana (manifestation), or how these Dhammas actually appear, how they establish themselves in our perception. Then, all of these Dhammas are everything that exists in the world, and everything only exists in interdependent origination. So, these salakkhanas, self-characteristics, according to the Theravada tradition, also only arise in interdependent origination, as opposed to the Sarvastivada tradition. The book is very emphatic on that fact. There are Theravadans who would agree salakkhanas are empty of interdependent nature, yet nevertheless, they have a lasting characteristic. Whether today, in the future, or in the past, the characteristic of earth remains hardness.

An intelligent man knows we can only experience hardness when we know softness, and without knowing hardness we cannot know softness. Similarly, heat being the self-characteristic of fire, every intelligent mans knows that we can only know heat when we know coolness. I know this book to be cool because my hand is warm. If I don’t know the hand being warm, I cannot know the coolness of this book. So, obviously, these salakkhanas (self-characteristics), the sabhava (self-natures) of these Dhammas are not meant as something existing independently in the three times, but only as it is understood in the Vaibhasika tradition, and as it is criticized by the Mahayana scholars. The Theravada tradition never committed itself to such an idea. So, as the Vissudhi Magga clearly explains, interdependent origination, their interdependent nature, is emptiness. In the ultimate sense, these Dhammas, even in the Theravada tradition, are considered empty, yet nevertheless have a real characteristic or self-nature, which is lasting.

To the students of Mahayana, the structure of these self-existing Dhammas, or self-existing characteristics, was smashed completely over hundreds of years and many endless disputes about which Dhamma has real characteristic and which does not, which is just a Dhamma of convenience and which really exists. This was a subject matter of endless discussion in the history of Dhamma. Each school of Buddhism had its own version of what was the real existing Dhamma and what was only a Dhamma of convenience.

Nagarjuna criticized and logically demolished the possibility of sabhava, self-existing nature. Logically, in the Buddhist sense, it is not tenable. In Mahayana Buddhism, there appeared disciples of Nagarjuna, like Chandrakirti and the Prasandrikas, who claimed that Dhammas have no nature whatsoever, that the nature of Dhammas is the nature of others, and whatever exists exists in the virtue of existence of others. So, this is the meaning of emptiness.

Some scholars, as you know, liked sabhava for convenience, merely for the sake of argument. Then, from the Yogacara school comes a very different interpretation: outer things have no nature at all, but that which has real nature is the mind and its mental factors. All that we understand in this world is just a manifestation of this mind.

Now, in the Theravada tradition we come to a middle position. The Theravada Abhidhamma is based on the analysis of these sabhava, real or existing or self natures, but these self-natures are definitely existing only in interdependence and cannot arise without the existence of other entities. So, this is an approach which is followed in our analysis, and with this understanding we come to the first supreme object or meaning in the world, citta.

http://www.phathue.com/buddhism/dharma-talks/abhidhamma-with-dhammadipa/

Aneh, di sini kok seolah-olah Vaibhasika/Sarvastivada tidak menganut interdependensi yah? Dan jika Theravada memang menganut interdependensi seperti yang dikemukakan Nagarjuna, mengapa masih mempertahankan ide sabhava itu sendiri? (Walaupun memang tidak menutup kemungkinan adanya perbedaan pendapat dalam sekte Theravada sendiri seperti halnya Hadayavatthu.)

[djoe]

This demonstrates that the exalted beings achieve liberation from cyclic existence by understanding nonerroneously the reality of existence and nonexistence. Since neither of these can exist without depending on the other,
their reality is to not have an essence established through their own nature.

Some argue that since the Buddha has said that samsara—an entity—and nirvana—a nonentity—exist, it makes no sense that they lack essence. In response to that the Buddha has said that they exist in accordance with the mode of perception of an ordinary person’s conventional consciousness, but not in accordance with an exalted being’s mode of perception of reality. The attainment of nirvana is said to be the realization of cessation—at the state of fruition— through the wisdom by means of which one understands completely that cyclic existence is not essentially arisen.

On the contrary, if the attainment of nirvana were posited as the extinction of afflictions that exist through their own characteristics and the non-arising of further aggregates this would be refuted on the grounds that in that case none of these—neither the realization of cessation, viz. nirvana, nor the extinction of afflictive emotions and aggregates—would be possible. This is the meaning of authoritative sources expounding the nirvana of the lesser vehicle as well. The rest of this treatise is written in support of this proposition. In short, if the realization and attainment of nirvana at the stage of achieving arhathood do not imply the realization of the way things really are, that is, ultimate truth, then the attainment of nirvana would absolutely not be possible.

This is the principal reason that this fact is proved primarily through citations of the su¯tras of the lesser vehicle.